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LATE TO THE CROWD: HOW OHIO’S
CROWDFUNDING BILL FAILS TO ACHIEVE
INCLUSIVENESS AND EFFICIENCY
NATHAN HILL*
ABSTRACT
Almost half of all small and medium sized businesses within the United States fail
within the first five years. One of the main contributing factors to that failure is the
inability to raise enough money to operate. While there are many ways for businesses
to raise operating capital, the most accessible and sometimes the most efficient way is
through a process called equity-based crowdfunding—the offering of shares in
exchange for an investment raised through an online portal. In 2012, after seeing the
success of equity-based crowdfunding in other countries, the United States passed the
Jumpstart Our Business Startups Act (JOBS Act) to make crowdfunding safer and
more accessible for both entrepreneurs and investors. Not surprisingly, the federal law
did little to make crowdfunding more inclusive and efficient. Therefore, state
legislatures and governors began passing and enacting what they called “intrastate
crowdfunding laws”—laws that permit local businesses to use crowdfunding outside
some of the requirements of Securities and Exchange Commission regulations—to
find new avenues for raising money and to create competition in an effort to attract
new business to their states.
In early 2021, after much delay, Ohio became the thirty-seventh state to pass
intrastate crowdfunding. However, the Ohio law is almost an identical copy of the
JOBS Act and was passed with a greater focus on large corporations than with small
and medium sized entities (SMEs) in mind. Therefore, this Note recommends that
Ohio amend House Bill 312 to create a more efficient way for SMEs to raise funds,
while also creating more inclusivity than other money raising options. The Note
accomplishes this by using successful intrastate crowdfunding laws in other states and
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equity-based funding programs in other countries to build upon what the Ohio
legislature created in HB 312. In the end, this Note contends that a more efficient and
inclusive intrastate crowdfunding bill could be a spark to the economy, the job market,
and innovation in Ohio.
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I. INTRODUCTION

James Kindred and Rob Fink of the United Kingdom’s Big Drop Brewing Co. had
big aspirations to see their low alcohol/alcohol free beer not only in Europe, but across
Australia and the United States.1 Unable to receive funding from a bank or venture
capital firm in order to market their beers outside the United Kingdom, James and Rob
looked to equity-based crowdfunding—the raising of capital through selling securities
(or shares or stakes of ownership) to everyday people via an online portal—to raise
the money needed to succeed.2 In March of 2020, in the midst of a global pandemic,
James and Rob launched their equity-based crowdfunding campaign on the European
portal site, Seedrs.3 Their campaign offered investors from within the United Kingdom

1 See About Big Drop, BIG DROP BREWING CO. LTD., https://www.bigdropbrew.com/aboutbig-drop/ (last visited Oct. 7, 2020); Edith Hancock, 5 Successfully Crowdfunded Drinks Brands
in 2020, THE DRINKS BUS. (Oct. 5, 2020), https://www.thedrinksbusiness.com/2020/10/5successfully-crowdfunded-drinks-brands-in-2020/.
2 Id.
3 See Big Drop Brewing, SEEDRS, https://www.seedrs.com/big-drop-brewingco/sections/idea (last visited Oct. 7, 2020); see also Hancock, supra note 1.
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7.55% equity ownership in Big Drop Brewing.4 Nine months after their campaign
launch, they exceeded their goal by 123% and raised approximately $813,451.76. 5
Now, thanks to efficient equity-based crowdfunding laws in the United Kingdom, Rob
and James can scale their business without having to rely on a traditional bank loan or
venture firm funding.
However, what occurred for Big Drop Brewing Co. was the exception, not the rule,
especially in the United States. Countries around the world have been using equitybased crowdfunding to create a more efficient and inclusive way for businesses to
raise capital.6 Places like the United Kingdom and New Zealand have been largely
successful.7 These countries are seeing success rates of roughly 78%, with success
measured by whether the business is still active at least two years after utilizing
crowdfunding.8 While some of these programs are still in their infancy, the signs are
encouraging. In New Zealand, the first year of equity-based crowdfunding saw
twenty-one campaigns raise approximately 12 million NZD.9 Within the United
States, the Federal Jumpstart Our Business Startups Act (JOBS Act) was passed in
2012 to introduce equity-based crowdfunding, while seeking to copy the success of
crowdfunding from other markets.10 But, with strict Securities and Exchange
Commission (SEC) restrictions and exorbitant SEC registration fees, small- and
medium-sized entities (SMEs) in the United States have struggled to use equity-based
crowdfunding to their advantage. One of the JOBS Act’s main goals was to make
crowdfunding safer and more accessible for both entrepreneurs and investors.11
Armed with new laws and changing SEC regulations, businesses hoped they could use
equity-based crowdfunding to help their ideas come to life. Unlike Big Drop Brewing
Co., many businesses’ dreams did not become a reality. Numerous obstacles and even
more requirements halted equity-based crowdfunding from becoming what it truly
could be: a spark for economies, job markets, and innovation.12 With that knowledge,

4 See Big Drop Brewing, supra note 3.
5 See id. (converting from the British pound to U.S. dollars).
6 See Andrew A. Schwartz, The Gatekeepers of Crowdfunding, 75 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 885,
885–86 (2018).
7 See id. at 914; see also PAOLO BUTTURINI, CROWDFUNDING FOR SMES: A EUROPEAN
PERSPECTIVE 205 (Roberto Bottiglia & Flavio Pichler eds., 2016) (discussing how
crowdfunding from within the United Kingdom grew more than 600% between 2012 and 2013
and is still considered a fast-growing sector).
8 Schwartz, supra note 6, at 927.
9 Id. (12M NZD is the equivalent of 10M USD).
10 See Off. of the Press Sec’y, President Obama to Sign Jumpstart Our Business Startups
(JOBS) Act, THE WHITE HOUSE (Apr. 5, 2012), https://obamawhitehouse.archives.gov/thepress-office/2012/04/05/president-obama-sign-jumpstart-our-business-startups-jobs-act.
11 Jumpstart Our Business Startups (JOBS) Act, Pub. L. No. 112-106, 126 Stat. 306 (2012).
12 Jo Won, Jumpstart Regulation Crowdfunding: What is Wrong and How to Fix It, 22 LEWIS
& CLARK L. REV. 1393, 1405–12 (2018).
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states began passing their own intrastate crowdfunding legislation, in an attempt to
offer more clarity and greater results than the federal law. Today, 36 states have some
form of intrastate crowdfunding legislation. 13 On December 17, 2020, the State of
Ohio became number 37, with the passage of HB 312, which became effective in Ohio
on March 31, 2021.14
Equity-based crowdfunding laws around the world are centered upon two
functional goals: efficiency and inclusivity.15 This Note will consider efficiency in
crowdfunding laws to mean removing or streamlining certain regulations and barriers
to make it easier and faster for SMEs to raise capital than it would be through
traditional methods.16 Inclusivity in its truest form, on the other hand, would be
crowdfunding laws where any and all entrepreneurs are invited to pitch their company
to “the crowd” through an internet portal.17 This idea comes from the fact that anyone
with a good business idea should be able to become an entrepreneur. 18 However, no
one has ever advocated for a fully inclusive system, as regulations are necessary to
protect investors, entities, and the market. 19 Therefore, this Note’s use of inclusivity
will consider laws that include measures to allow more people to use crowdfunding
than would be allowed through traditional methods (such as bank loans, private equity
financing, Regulation A+, etc.).
Effective intrastate and equity-based crowdfunding laws around the world tend to
focus on either efficiency or inclusivity. New Zealand, for example, has equity-based
crowdfunding laws that are more efficient, but at the cost of inclusivity. 20 Laws in the
United States, like the JOBS Act, focus far more on inclusivity than efficiency.21
Ohio’s HB 312, however, attempts to juggle both, but by doing so, creates a bill that
lacks effectiveness, while several states, like Michigan, have shown that these laws
can work.22 Therefore, this Note proposes that Ohio change course and pass a new

13
Interstate
Crowdfunding Resources,
N. AM. SEC. ADM’RS ASS’N,
https://www.nasaa.org/industry-resources/securities-issuers/intrastate-crowdfunding-directory
(last visited Mar. 10, 2022).
14 See H.B. 312, 133d Gen. Assemb., Reg. Sess. (Ohio 2019–2020).
15 Schwartz, supra note 6, at 885.
16 See C. Steven Bradford, Crowdfunding and the Federal Securities Laws, 2012 COLUM.
BUS. L. REV. 1, 5 (2012); see also Christian W. Borek, Comment, Regulation A+: Navigating
Equity-Based Crowdfunding Under Title IV of the Jobs Act, 47 CUMB. L. REV. 143, 147–50,
155–56 (2017) (showing that “traditional methods of” raising capital include bank lending,
venture capital, retained earnings, Regulation D, Regulation A, Regulation A+).
17 Schwartz, supra note 6, at 905–06.
18 Id.
19 Id.
20 Id. at 886.
21 Id. at 910.
22 See Michigan Invests Locally Exemption (M.I.L.E.) – Intrastate Crowdfunding, DEP’T OF
LICENSING
AND
REGUL.
AFFS.,
https://www.michigan.gov/lara/0,4601,7-154-
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and improved intrastate crowdfunding bill that focuses on efficiency, with less focus
on inclusivity, but while not entirely ignoring an inclusive approach. A new bill is
required because intrastate crowdfunding presents advantages to entrepreneurs that
other financing options do not, while also increasing the economic activities of states
in a way that is more stable than traditional methods.23
The rate at which state intrastate crowdfunding laws are being passed shows how
a crowdfunding exemption to SEC registration exists more comfortably and more
efficiently in a state regulatory market than in a federal regulatory structure. 24 Ohio
needs an intrastate crowdfunding bill because SEC regulation is not a one-size-fits-all
approach. By having its own legislation, Ohio can create an environment specific to
Ohio SME needs that allows these entrepreneurs and small businesses to thrive, while
innovating and regulating the law as it sees fit.25 Ohio needs a new intrastate
crowdfunding law because the impact on the economies and markets of states with
successful laws are clear.26 The issuer’s campaign limits are higher under Ohio law
($5 million raising limit) than under Federal Crowdfunding (FCF) Regulations ($1.07
million raising limit), and Ohio has the ability to set its own investor limits that are
different from SEC rules, where strict limits are placed on even accredited investors.27
Therefore, Ohio can and must do more for the emerging SMEs in the state.
While HB 312 was a step in the right direction, it did too little for either efficiency
or inclusivity. Efficiency is lacking because HB 312, with a few exceptions, is almost
a carbon copy of the JOBS Act.28 The JOBS Act, while incorporating both factors,
had a much stronger focus on inclusivity than efficiency. So, by passing a similar bill,
Ohio’s intrastate crowdfunding bill is no more efficient than the SEC’s other offerings,
like Regulation D or A+.29 Inclusivity is also lacking in HB 312. Mainly, HB 312 was

89334_61343_32915-514201--,00.html (last visited Oct. 30, 2020); Schwartz, supra note 6, at
885.
23 Infra Part III.A.
24 See JAMES D. COX ET AL., SECURITIES REGULATION: CASES AND MATERIALS 304 (Rachel
E. Barkow et al. eds., 8th ed. 2017).
25 Brian, Intrastate Crowdfunding and Blue Sky Laws, CROWDWISE,
https://crowdwise.org/regulations-and-law/intrastate-crowdfunding-and-blue-skylaws/#:~:text=Intrastate%20crowdfunding%20laws%20allow%20small,intended%20for%20
more%20mature%20companies (last updated Oct. 15, 2019).
26 Infra Part III.A.
27 Infra Part IV.
28 Compare H.B. 312, 133d Gen. Assemb., Reg. Sess. (Ohio 2019–2020), with Jumpstart Our
Business Startups (JOBS) Act, Pub. L. No. 112-106, 126 Stat. 306 (2012).
29 Bradford, supra note 16, at 31; see also 17 C.F.R. § 230.502 (2021); 17 C.F.R. § 230.506
(2021) (describing the numerous different disclosure requirements that can change based on
how much an entity is issuing, who they are issuing to, what kind of company they are, etc.).
For a brief summary of Regulation D, see Will Kenton, SEC Regulation D (Reg D),
INVESTOPEDIA (July 29, 2020), https://www.investopedia.com/terms/r/regulationd.asp. For a
brief summary of Regulation A+, see Max Crawford, Regulation A+: What Entrepreneurs Need
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only passed after adding an amendment to assist large multi-million-dollar
corporations secure financing for real estate projects,30 which means that HB 312 was
not passed with the main goal of opening more avenues for SMEs to raise capital.
This, in general, creates an underinclusive bill.
Because Ohio’s HB 312 fails to provide for more inclusive or efficient
crowdfunding efforts, the legislative and executive branches must work together to
pass a new efficient intrastate crowdfunding bill to spur the economy, the job market,
and innovation in Ohio. An initial goal of HB 312 was to make Ohio the most business
friendly state in the country and assist SMEs in finding faster ways to raise capital.
But the way the law stands now, businesses will neither seek Ohio out as a launching
pad nor have more efficient financing options. Businesses across the country, from
multi-million-dollar professional sports teams31 to the smaller, locally-owned coffee
shops32 have used some version of crowdfunding to help them reach their goals. Ohio
must act to create better crowdfunding opportunities for its residents, while also
seeking to give the state a competitive advantage over others.33
This Note recommends specific improvements that could be included in such a law
and explains how they would help serve the legislature’s goals. Part II of this Note
will discuss the background of crowdfunding, the JOBS Act, intrastate crowdfunding
in general, and the history of intrastate crowdfunding legislation in Ohio. Part III will
analyze the failures of the JOBS Act with respect to SMEs and why Ohio sought to
supplement it. Further, Part III will discuss how intrastate crowdfunding provides a
better alternative to more traditional methods, while also looking to examine the
positive impact intrastate crowdfunding has on jobs, the economy, and innovation.
Part III lastly considers the criticisms of intrastate crowdfunding, such as fraud,
investor risk, and small business failure. In the end, Part III will establish that the
benefits of a properly-designed crowdfunding program far outweigh the costs. As Part
IV then explains, HB 312 has many shortcomings in the areas of entry requirements,
portal operations, investor limits, and disclosures. Specifically, HB 312 fails to be
either efficient or inclusive, and thus falls well short of its goal to make Ohio “the
most business-friendly state in the country”.34 Finally, Part V will use the history of

to Know, START ENGINE (Apr. 9, 2021), https://www.startengine.com/blog/regulation-a-whatentrepreneurs-need-to-know/.
30 See Permits Certain Intrastate Equity Crowdfunding: Hearing on H.B. 312 Before the S.
Comm. on Fin., 133d Sess. (Ohio 2020) (statement of Josh Glessing, Haslam Sports Group,
H.B. 312); see also id. (statement of Thomas Niehaus, The Sherwin Williams Company, H.B.
312).
31 See Edward A. Fallone, Crowdfunding and Sport: How Soon Until the Fans Own the
Franchise?, 25 MARQ. SPORTS L. REV. 7 (2014) (referring to the public ownership of the
National Football League team the Green Bay Packers).
32 Albert J. Masco, Turn on the Lights at *Coffee Bar, KICKSTARTER (Aug. 23, 2019),
https://www.kickstarter.com/projects/asteriskcoffebar/turn-on-the-lights-at-coffee-bar.
33 See Kelly Mathews, Comment, Crowdfunding, Everyone’s Doing It: Why and How North
Carolina Should Too, 94 N.C. L. REV. 276, 298 (2015).
34 Permits Certain Intrastate Equity Crowdfunding: Hearing on H.B. 312 Before the S.
Comm. on Fin., supra note 30 (statement of Rep. Jena Powell, Sponsor, H.B. 10).
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legislation in Ohio and more successful intrastate crowdfunding programs to examine
how Ohio should place an emphasis on efficiency, while not totally counting out
inclusivity, through a blueprint for a new and improved program.
Big Drop Brewing Co. is just one example of how, at the tipping point of economic
decline, efficient and inclusive equity-based crowdfunding laws are a viable,
successful option.35 Ohio attempted to do this with HB 312, but after leaving the bill
in committee for over a year, the legislature did not do enough to assist Ohio’s
SMEs.36 With too much dependence on the JOBS Act and a focus on assisting only
large corporations, HB 312 will be ineffective from the start.37 Therefore, Ohio should
do everything possible to further assist in the growth of innovation and ideas, which
is why it is imperative for the state to amend HB 312.
II. BACKGROUND: CROWDFUNDING, ITS MANY FORMS, AND ITS EVOLUTION IN OHIO
Much like the many different entities that use it, there are multiple different forms
of crowdfunding available to entrepreneurs in the United States. The most popular
forms include donation-based,38 rewards-based,39 peer-to-peer lending,40 and equitybased crowdfunding. While each variation has its benefits, this Note seeks to
understand the nuances of equity-based crowdfunding and its importance to Ohio. The
focus on equity-based crowdfunding in general is due to its relative novelty. It is a
new way for SMEs to obtain funding in the United States, an important tool that allows
entrepreneurs to raise capital, and a way to seek financing that does not pull attention

35 See About Big Drop, supra note 1; Hancock, supra note 1.
36 Status Reports, THE OHIO LEG., https://www.legislature.ohio.gov/legislation/status-reports
(last updated Jan. 2021); see H.B. 312, 133d Gen. Assemb., Reg. Sess. (Ohio 2019–2020).
37 See JD Davidson, Ohio Senate Passes 4 Bills Aimed at Helping Small Businesses,
MAHONING MATTERS (Dec. 11, 2020), https://www.mahoningmatters.com/local-news/ohiosenate-passes-4-bills-aimed-at-helping-small-businesses-3172976
[https://web.archive.org/web/20210218015024/https://www.mahoningmatters.com/localnews/ohio-senate-passes-4-bills-aimed-at-helping-small-businesses-3172976] (discussing HB
312 in one sentence at the bottom of the article); see also Mary Vanac, Cleveland’s Skyline
Could Dramatically Change Under Legislation Signed by DeWine, CLEVELAND BUS. J. (Dec.
29,
2020),
https://www.bizjournals.com/cleveland/news/2020/12/29/dewine-signscommercial-real-estate-legislation.html (proving that HB 312 was only passed with the
intention of helping Sherwin Williams, the Columbus Crew, and Origin Malt in ranges from
$10 million to $35 million).
38 Bradford, supra note 16, at 31 (“Donation-model crowdfunding sites are not offering
securities to investors. Contributors receive absolutely nothing in return for their contributions,
so they clearly have no expectation of profits . . . .”).
39 Id. at 32 (“The reward . . . models . . . do not involve securities under federal law, as long
as the reward or the pre-purchased product is all the investor is promised in return for her
contribution.”).
40 FLAVIO PICHLER & ILARIA TEZZA, CROWDFUNDING FOR SMES: A EUROPEAN PERSPECTIVE
11 (Roberto Bottiglia & Flavio Pichler eds., 2016) (“Peer-to-peer (P2P) lending . . . resembles
bank loans . . . [where] investors finance a project or an idea and obtain a financial return in the
forms of periodic interest and principal at the end of lending period.”).
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away from the core activities of the SMEs’ business model.41 Further, there is
relatively little research on equity-based crowdfunding in the United States, but many
in Europe have found it to be the best opportunity to remove the gap to equity that
many SMEs face.42
While crowdfunding is at its infancy within the United States, it is nothing new.
Composers Beethoven and Mozart are said to have used “crowdfunding” to raise
money for concerts and the publication of manuscripts.43 But crowdfunding did not
become prominent in the United States until after the 2008 recession. During this time,
businesses and entrepreneurs were unable to receive funding from traditional
sources.44 From 2008 to 2012, legislators and entrepreneurs struggled to come to a
consensus on how best to balance the consumer protection values and other goals of
SEC regulations against the need to encourage economic activity, including, for
example, innovation.45 Then, in 2012, the JOBS Act was passed in an attempt to open
the doors of equity-based crowdfunding to more people.46
A.

Generally, What Is Crowdfunding?

Crowdfunding can be defined in numerous ways. Most famously and most
succinctly, crowdfunding is defined as “rais[ing] money through relatively small
contributions from a large number of people.”47 Crowdfunding asks the “crowd” to
provide a solution, raising capital, to a financial problem.48 Before the passage of the
JOBS Act, 57% of small businesses could not find additional funding within four years
of looking.49 Therefore, SMEs required other avenues to receive the financial support
that was essential to expanding or starting their business. Enter equity-based
crowdfunding. In the United States, crowdfunding is facilitated through internet

41 ANJA HAGEDORN & ANDREAS PINKWART, CROWDFUNDING IN EUROPE: THE FINANCING
PROCESS OF EQUITY-BASED CROWDFUNDING: AN EMPIRICAL ANALYSIS 71 (Dennis Bruntje &
Oliver Gajda eds. 2016).
42 Andreas Wald et al., It is Not All About Money: Obtaining Additional Benefits through
Equity Crowdfunding, 28 THE J. OF ENTREPRENEURSHIP 270, 273 (2019).
43 PICHLER & TEZZA, supra note 40, at 6.
44 Id. at 7 (discussing how the role of the financial crisis was important to the spike in
crowdfunding because from 2007–2008, bank credit ceased to exist in the United States).
45 See Mathews, supra note 33, at 280.
46 Jumpstart Our Business Startups (JOBS) Act, Pub. L. No. 112-106, 126 Stat. 306 (2012);
see also Borek, supra note 16, at 147.
47 Bradford, supra note 16, at 10.
48 PICHLER & TEZZA, supra note 40, at 9.
49 NAT’L SMALL BUS. ASS’N, SMALL BUSINESS ACCESS TO CAPITAL SURVEY 4,
http://www.nsba.biz/wp-content/uploads/2012/07/Access-to-Capital-Survey.pdf (last updated
Dec. 2012).

Published by EngagedScholarship@CSU, 2022

9

826

CLEVELAND STATE LAW REVIEW

[70:817

platforms called portals, such as Kickstarter, Indiegogo, and, in Ohio, Wunderfund.50
These sites distributed more than $8.3 billion between 2008 and 2017. 51
While these portals have distributed billions of dollars over their lifetimes, many
of them do not deal in equity-based crowdfunding. Because there are already billions
of dollars for SMEs through these other methods, why does the United States, and
specifically Ohio, need equity-based crowdfunding? Equity-based crowdfunding is
independently important because, according to entrepreneurs throughout Israel and
Norway, equity-based crowdfunding is uniquely situated to provide entrepreneurs and
SMEs both inward and outward benefits.52 Outward benefits are aimed at “increasing
public exposure and advancing the project’s success by recruiting additional
investors.”53 On the other hand, inward benefits are implemented through investors’
contributions of personal experience and expertise.54 Based on the data, these benefits
that derive from using equity-based crowdfunding can become resources that advance
future success of the SMEs.55 But, even if it provides these benefits that other
crowdfunding options may not provide, what is equity-based crowdfunding?
In short, equity-based crowdfunding is the option that is the most like traditional
investing in a company.56 Here, an entity asks for support of its project by offering an
ownership stake in its company.57 This stock includes possible voting rights and an
expectation to receive profits in the form of dividends, as well as capital
appreciation.58 The Supreme Court has held that stock purchased through
crowdfunding is a “security” within the meaning of federal securities laws. 59
Traditionally, that would trigger the requirement that the entity must register with the
SEC, but securities covered by Title III of the JOBS Act are exempt from
registration.60 Because equity-based crowdfunding is the newest form of
crowdfunding, it has received the least amount of discussion and its implications are

50 See KICKSTARTER, https://www.kickstarter.com/ (last visited Nov. 30, 2020); INDIEGOGO,
https://www.indiegogo.com/
(last
visited
Nov.
30,
2020);
WUNDERFUND,
https://www.wunderfund.co/ (last visited Nov. 30, 2020).
51 See Evan Glustrom, Note, Intrastate Crowdfunding in Alaska: Is There Security in
Following the Crowd?, 34 ALASKA L. REV. 293, 300 (2017).
52 Wald et al., supra note 42, at 278–79.
53 Id. at 270.
54 Id.
55 Id.
56 Borek, supra note 16, at 148; see also Bradford supra note 16, at 10.
57 See PICHLER & TEZZA, supra note 40, at 11.
58 Id.
59 Bradford, supra note 16, at 33 (citing United Hous. Found., Inc. v. Forman, 421 U.S. 837,
848 (1975)).
60 Jumpstart Our Business Startups (JOBS) Act, Pub. L. No. 112-106, § 306, 126 Stat. 306,
315 (2012); Borek, supra note 16, at 144.
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relatively unknown.61 However, equity-based crowdfunding presents a more
attractive avenue for SMEs to raise capital.62 The JOBS Act was essential to making
this happen. Its addition of investor protections and safeguards against fraud allowed
equity-based crowdfunding to exist in the United States. 63 However, after a delay in
regulations from the SEC, many states found the JOBS Act too restrictive and too
convoluted, so they began passing intrastate crowdfunding laws to loosen certain
restrictions in the areas of offering limits, investor requirements, portal operations,
advertising regulation, and disclosure requirements.64 But the true benefits of equitybased crowdfunding are relatively unknown in Ohio, and HB 312 is more similar to
the JOBS Act than to other states’ equity-based intrastate legislation.65 This could
create an underutilized option for SMEs based on the JOBS Act’s restrictions and
convolution, which could impact Ohio at a time when it is trying to increase its
economic activity.66 More can be done to have a positive effect on the economy, the
job market, and innovation in Ohio, as other intrastate crowdfunding programs have
shown.67
B.

The JOBS Act of 2012

Crowdfunding exists in the United States as a product of the JOBS Act, which
President Obama signed in April of 2012.68 The Act was passed with the intention of
spurring small businesses and entrepreneurs by removing costly regulations and
making it easier for them to access capital through new registration exemptions.69 The
JOBS Act brought equity-based crowdfunding to the United States by creating a “new

61 Mathews, supra note 33, at 303.
62 See id. at 299–01.
63 Borek, supra note 16, at 148–50 (explaining that the goal of the Securities Act of 1933 of
providing investor and market protections exists today in the JOBS Act of 2012).
64 See Mathews, supra note 33, at 280.
65 Compare H.B. 312, 133d Gen. Assemb., Reg. Sess. (Ohio 2019–2020), with Jumpstart Our
Business Startups (JOBS) Act, Pub. L. No. 112-106, 126 Stat. 306 (2012).
66 See Permits Certain Intrastate Equity Crowdfunding: Hearing on H.B. 312 Before the S.
Comm. on Fin., supra note 30 (statement of Rep. Jena Powell, Sponsor, H.B. 10); see, e.g.,
Andrew J. Tobias, New Ohio Ad Campaign Aimed at Attracting Businesses Touts State’s Low
Taxes . . . , CLEVELAND.COM (Feb. 11, 2021), https://www.cleveland.com/open/2021/02/newohio-ad-campaign-aimed-at-attracting-businesses-touts-states-low-taxes-sparks-onlinedebate.html (discussing one of Ohio’s most recent attempts to increase its economic activity by
trying to attract more talent to the state).
67 See, e.g., Michigan Invests Locally Exemption (M.I.L.E.) – Intrastate Crowdfunding, supra
note 22; Andrew A. Schwartz, supra note 6 (discussing New Zealand’s approach to its creation
of crowdfunding legislation to stimulate economic growth and its comparison to U.S.
legislation).
68 Off. of the Press Sec’y, supra note 10.
69 158 Cong. Rec. 38, H1275 (daily ed. Mar. 8, 2012) (statement of Rep. Cantor).
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exemption from registration” under the SEC regulations for small investors.70 The Act
amended section four of the Securities Act of 1933 (“the Securities Act”) by providing
an exemption from registration for small startups where, for any twelve-month period,
the company sells no more than $1,000,000 of shares in the aggregate to
investors.71 In addition, no single investor can purchase more than $2,000 of
shares or 5% of the investor’s annual income or net worth, whichever is larger
(10% for investors with annual income or net worth exceeding $100,000).72
Importantly, both the offering and investor limits appear in sections of the Act that can
be altered by state legislation. Lastly, crowdfunding transactions must occur through
a funding portal that complies with any current and future SEC regulations.73
However, one important requirement remained that hindered the JOBS Act’s
effectiveness. SMEs could still only receive investments from “accredited
investors.”74 In other words, if an individual does not have a net worth greater than
$1,000,000, they will be unable to invest through crowdfunding.75 This, in turn,
significantly limited the number of people who could invest in equity-based
crowdfunding and certainly did not make it any easier for SMEs to find and raise
capital. While the JOBS Act had good intentions, efforts are still needed from state
governments to make equity-based crowdfunding what it truly is: a chance to spark to
innovation through more inclusive and efficient efforts. With a better understanding
of the JOBS Act in place, it is appropriate to take a deeper look at intrastate
crowdfunding in general.
C.

Intrastate Crowdfunding

The JOBS Act falls short in many regards.76 Luckily, there are processes available
that allow an SME to avoid registering with the SEC. To avoid registration, the
entrepreneur must ensure that the issuances they offer fully comply with either the
Federal Crowdfunding exemption or their state intrastate exception. However, all state
laws, like HB 312, that are passed as a state intrastate crowdfunding exception fall

70 Jumpstart Our Business Startups (JOBS) Act, § 302(a); Peter C. Sumners, Note, IV.
Crowdfunding America’s Small Businesses After the Jobs Act of 2012, 32 REV. BANKING & FIN.
L. 38, 43 (2012).
71 Jumpstart Our Business Startups (JOBS) Act, § 302(a).
72 Id.
73 Id. at § 302(b).
74 Id. See generally SEC Modernizes the Accredited Investor Definition, U.S. SEC. EXCH.
COMM’N, https://www.sec.gov/news/press-release/2020-191 (last visited Nov. 20, 2020)
(explaining the new and updated definitions of “accredited investors”). While this new rule
expands the number of people who can invest in businesses, it still does not allow everyday
citizens to invest in companies, hindering an SMEs use of equity-based crowdfunding.
75 U.S. Sec. Exch. Comm’n, Accredited Investors – Updated Investor Bulletin,
INVESTOR.GOV (Apr. 14, 2021), https://www.investor.gov/introduction-investing/generalresources/news-alerts/alerts-bulletins/investor-bulletins/updated-3.
76 Infra Part III.B.
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under some sort of SEC regulation based on section 3(a) of the 1933 Securities Act.77
In short, “all intrastate crowdfunding laws must comply with the federal securities
exemption but [can] vary in regards to investment limitations and portal
restrictions.”78 The SEC rules and regulations allow intrastate securities to be sold and
the state intrastate crowdfunding laws allow them to be sold through the act of
crowdfunding. Therefore, if the SME complies with either its state or the federal
exception, it can be exempt from registration under section 3(a)(11) of the Securities
Act of 1933 and the SEC rules interpreting it.79 As mentioned above, because the most
flexibility is provided to the states in the areas of offerings, investments, and portals,
which are the areas having the biggest effect on both issuers and investors, 37 states,
including Ohio, have passed equity-based crowdfunding legislation that provides an
exception/safe harbor to the federal law for purely intrastate crowdfunding
endeavors.80 So, what does this intrastate crowdfunding entail?
Crowdfunding of this type “completely exempt[s] intrastate crowdfunding from
SEC regulation so long as the issuer is organized in the state and all investors reside
in the [same] state.”81 For example, an Ohio incorporated business can advertise,
market, and sell a security through a crowdfunding internet platform within Ohio to
an Ohio resident and not have to register with the SEC. 82 This is different from
financing under the JOBS Act, Regulation D, and regular intrastate offerings (not
involving crowdfunding) because, under the regulations and federal offerings,
advertisement and general solicitation of the issuance of securities is prohibited and
violations will bar the entity from being able to use Regulation D or intrastate offerings
in the future.83 Through these methods, using an internet portal would be seen as
general solicitation/advertisement and would violate Regulation D and SEC
exemptions to registration.84 Local intrastate crowdfunding laws provide a more
77 Securities Act of 1933 § 3(a), 15 U.S.C. § 77c(a).
78 15 U.S.C. § 77c(a)(11); Michael Vignone, Inside Equity-Based Crowdfunding: Online
Financing Alternatives for Small Businesses, 91 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 803, 811 (2016).
79 Dana Shilling & Christine Vincent, The ’33 Act and its Registration Process, in LAWYER’S
DESK BOOK § 5.03 (2022).
80 Interstate Crowdfunding Resources, supra note 13; see also Mathews, supra note 33, at
280 (“While the SEC drags its feet, failing to promulgate rules to implement the equity
crowdfunding exemption, several pioneering states have passed their own intrastate
crowdfunding exemptions.”).
81 Glustrom, supra note 51, at 308.
82 Vignone, supra note 78, at 811 (discussing the same example, but for the State of
Wisconsin).
83 See Jumpstart Our Business Startups Act (JOBS Act), Pub. L. No. 112-106, § 201(a)(1),
126 Stat. 306 (2012) (discussing the general ban on solicitation and advertisement under the
JOBS Act, which was later allowed under amendments to SEC Rules 144 and 506(a)); The
Securities Act § 4(a)(1) (stating the ban that can occur using general solicitation under
Regulation D).
84 See, e.g., In re Kenman Corp., SEC Rel. No. 34-21962 [1985-1986 Transfer Binder], Fed.
Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) ¶ 83,767 (Apr. 19, 1985).
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efficient and cheaper alternative for local businesses to raise capital, as long as their
investors are state residents and the funding portal restricted access to those residents,
which could possibly lead to the success of more SMEs.85
All states tie their intrastate crowdfunding laws to one of the SEC’s rules and
regulations regarding the JOBS Act to exempt their local SMEs from having to
register. Even though the states can pass an intrastate crowdfunding law, parts of the
laws must still comply with SEC rules and regulations.86 Passing state laws in
connection with SEC rules and regulations allows the SME to utilize crowdfunding in
an efficient manner because the SEC will defer to the state security regulators in the
state.87 Otherwise, by just utilizing Regulation D or Rule 147A, the SMEs can raise
intrastate funds, but would be unable to do so through the act of crowdfunding. 88
Some states enact intrastate crowdfunding laws that tie in under Rule 147.89 This
rule was one of the first rules enacted by the SEC when the JOBS Act was passed.
Offerings and state legislation under Rule 147 were prohibited from having businesses
offer their shares to out-of-state residents.90 Therefore, SMEs were prohibited from
posting about their campaigns on social media or websites, which severely limited the
number of investors an SME could reach. Other states have enacted laws that are tied
to the newer Rule 147A, which was created to alter Rule 147 and create new avenues
for SME viability.91 The requirements included that
the issuer . . . be . . . doing business in the state, the issuer must reasonably
believe all purchasers are residents of the state, the purchaser may not resell
the security to an out-of-state resident within six months, and there must be
a . . . legend stating that . . . the security is not registered.92

85 See Securities Act Rules: Questions and Answers of General Applicability, U.S. SECS. AND
EXCH.
COMM’N,
http://www.sec.gov/divisions/corpfin/guidance/securitiesactrulesinterps.htm#141-03 (last updated Aug. 6, 2015) (answer to Questions 141.03, 141.04, and
141.05).
86 15 U.S.C. § 77(c)(a)(11).
87
Intrastate
Crowdfunding
and
Blue
Sky
Laws,
CROWDWISE,
https://crowdwise.org/regulations-and-law/intrastate-crowdfunding-and-blue-skylaws/#:~:text=Intrastate%20crowdfunding%20laws%20allow%20small,intended%20for%20
more%20mature%20companies (last updated Oct. 15, 2019).
88 The Securities Act § 3(a)(11).
89 See Exemptions to Facilitate Intrastate and Regional Securities Offerings, 80 Fed. Reg.
69,787 (Oct. 26, 2016).
90 Compliance and Disclosure Interpretation Question 141.04, U.S. SECS. AND EXCH.
COMM’N, https://www.sec.gov/divisions/corpfin/guidance/securitiesactrules-interps.htm (last
updated Sept. 20, 2017).
91 Glustrom, supra note 51, at 308–11 (discussing how the SEC updated Rule 147A in an
attempt to promulgate regulations that made it unnecessary for individual states to pass their
own legislation).
92 17 C.F.R. § 230.147(A)(c)(e)(f) (2017).
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If the businesses met the requirements under Rule 147A, they were provided a safe
harbor to the registration requirements of section 3(a)(11).93 Rule 147A provides new
flexibility for SMEs attempting to utilize intrastate crowdfunding from Rule 147 by
allowing an SME to offer a share to an out-of-state resident, but still prohibits selling
a share through intrastate crowdfunding to an out-of-state resident.94
Some states have tied their crowdfunding laws to Regulation A+. States that pass
their intrastate crowdfunding laws under Regulation A+ open their SMEs up to costly
disclosure requirements on both the federal and state level.95 The regulation requires
the filing of Form 1-A with the SEC prior to being permitted to crowdfund.96 While
the offering limit can be up to $20 million, these state laws are only effective for largersized entities or entities seeking to enter an exchange or IPO in the future.97 Lastly,
the disclosure costs could range from $200,000 to $400,000. 98 While Regulation A+
seems like a stronger alternative to intrastate crowdfunding laws due to its high
offering limit, very few states enact intrastate legislation that is tied to Regulation A+
because it is not as effective as it appears on its face.99
Because of the limitations that Regulation A+ and Rule 147/147A pose, most
states, including Ohio’s HB 312, tie their laws to Regulation D. Regulation D is a
combination of two SEC exceptions from registration, which exempt offerings of up
to $10 million in a 12-month period and exempt offerings sold to accredited
investors.100 State intrastate laws tied to Regulation D provide a safe harbor from
registration, because Regulation D at a purely federal level is extremely vulnerable to
violation.101 A violation would then prevent an SME using Regulation D from being
able to raise funds in the future under the Regulation.102 For example, general
solicitation or general offerings to unaccredited investors are not permitted.103 And, it
is on the issuer to ensure that the purchaser of the offering does not resell the security

93 Glustrom, supra note 51, at 310.
94 Id. at 310.
95 Amendments for Small and Additional Issues Exemptions Under the Securities Act
(“Regulation A+”), 80 Fed. Reg. at 21,807.
96 See 17 C.F.R. § 230.251.
97 Vignone, supra note 78, at 824.
98 Amendments for Small and Additional Issues Exemptions Under the Securities Act
(“Regulation A+”), 80 Fed. Reg. at 21,883.
99 Infra Part III.A.1.
100 17 C.F.R. § 230.504 (2017); Id. § 230.506.
101 The Securities Act § 18(b)(4)(D); see MARC I. STEINBERG, UNDERSTANDING SECURITIES
LAW 62 (7th ed. 2018) (“States . . . may set forth filing requirements and collect fees with respect
to . . . offerings.”).
102 17 C.F.R. § 230.508 (2017).
103 See id. § 230.506(c).
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within a specified period of time.104 A violation of either the solicitation or resale
requirement can result in fines and might destroy the exemption.105 However, with a
state intrastate crowdfunding law, the SME is able to solicit investors through an
online portal and through its website/social media, and it is not limited to only solicit
accredited investors.106
While entrepreneurs have numerous options when it comes to raising capital in
order to operate, state intrastate crowdfunding laws are generally seen as more
efficient and/or inclusive than federal regulations and are required in order to protect
an entity from defeating the federal exemption.107 However, for entrepreneurs in
Ohio, intrastate laws regarding crowdfunding are extremely new.
D.

Equity Based Crowdfunding in Ohio

The Ohio Legislature has attempted on three occasions to permit intrastate equitybased crowdfunding in Ohio. The 131st, 132nd, and 133rd General Assemblies all
attempted to adopt a crowdfunding bill.108 Each bill contained similar provisions,
made minor changes from the previous bill, and reached different points of the
legislative process. To understand what a perfect intrastate bill would look like, and
why HB 312 is not it, each attempt must be discussed.
House Bill 593 was introduced in the 131st General Assembly in 2016. 109 It was
Ohio’s first attempt at permitting intrastate crowdfunding and was the shortest of the
three bills. The bill died in committee, never receiving a single vote.110 It is unclear
why this bill did not gain any traction, as the two hearings on the bill only had
proponents speaking on its possible positive impacts. 111 Further, because the Bill was
never voted on, it is near impossible to see from where the opposition for this bill
came. However, even though the bill did not pass, certain parts of HB 593 laid the
groundwork for the next two versions of intrastate crowdfunding bills in Ohio. The
bill coined the name “OhioInvests,” which was retained in the program finally adopted

104 See id. § 230.506(4)(a)(1).
105 See id. § 230.508.
106 See H.B. 312, 133d Gen. Assemb., Reg. Sess. (Ohio 2020) (limiting Ohio securities
sellers to engage with accredited investors only).
107 Schwartz, supra note 6, at 885.
108 See H.B. 593, 131st Gen. Assemb., Reg. Sess. (Ohio 2015–2016); H.B. 10, 132d Gen.
Assemb., Reg. Sess. (Ohio 2017–2018); H.B. 312, 133d Gen. Assemb., Reg. Sess. (Ohio 2019–
2020).
109
House
Bill
593
–
Status,
THE
OHIO
https://www.legislature.ohio.gov/legislation/legislation-status?id=GA131-HB-593
updated Nov. 10, 2016).

LEG.,
(last

110 Id.
111
House
Bill
593
–
Committee
Activity,
THE
OHIO
LEG.,
https://www.legislature.ohio.gov/legislation/legislation-committee-documents?id=GA131HB-593 (last updated Nov. 29, 2016).
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under HB 312.112 The original HB 593 limited unaccredited investors to purchasing
no more than $10,000 in a single offering, which is still the limit today.113 House Bill
593 also introduced main concepts, including the general requirements for issuers of
securities, the requirement that all investors affirmatively acknowledge that they are
investing in a risky enterprise, and the requirements that an unaccredited investor must
qualify under before investing.114 However, this bill left open too many questions and
had a few faults. House Bill 593 left unclear who could be an issuer, who assumes
liability in the case of fraud, and how issuers receive their funds. 115 Further, this bill
had a high filing fee of $300 for an SME seeking to use OhioInvests, which could have
been seen as a barrier to entry for some entities in the state. Lastly, as there was no
explicit opposition to the bill in the legislative history, one reason for its death in
committee appears to be that the legislature saw it more as an opportunity to increase
the budget of the Ohio Division of Securities through fees and not as an opportunity
to increase economic activity in the state through innovation and assisting SMEs. 116
Because of this, HB 593 was probably doomed from the start, as evidenced by its death
in committee.117
The legislature’s second attempt, HB 10, was much more successful, though it was
not ultimately enacted. It took what its predecessor started and increased it by 150
pages, and it ended up looking fairly similar to the JOBS Act and the enacted HB
312.118 House Bill 10 was introduced in the 132nd General Assembly in 2017 and
passed in both chambers of the legislature.119 However, the bill was passed too late in
the session and never made it to the Governor’s desk, resulting in its ultimate
112 H.B. 593, 131st Gen. Assemb., Reg. Sess. (Ohio 2015–2016); H.B. 312, 133d Gen.
Assemb., Reg. Sess. (Ohio 2019–2020).
113 Ohio H.B. 593, § 1707.051(F).
114 See id. at §§ 1707.05, 1707.051, 1707.052, 1707.053; see H.B. 10, 132d Gen. Assemb.,
Reg. Sess. §§ 1707.052, 1707.053, 1707.054, 1707.056 (Ohio 2017–2018).
115 Permits Certain Intrastate Equity Crowdfunding: Hearing on H.B. 593 Before the H.
Comm. on Fin. Insts., Hous., and Hum. Dev., 131st Sess. (Ohio 2016) (statement of Jamie N.
Beier Grant, Director, Ottawa County Improvement Corporation, H.B. 593).
116 H.B. 593 §§ 1707.03(Q)(5), 1707.03(Y)(10), 1707.051(J)(3), 1707.054(A)(3) 131st Gen.
Assemb., Reg. Sess. (Ohio 2015–2016) (stating cost totaling almost $900 per entity to utilize
OhioInvests all going into the Ohio Division of Securities Budgetary Account) (showing that
no local impact statement was created, which is something that the other two bills have
received).
117 House Bill 593 – Status, THE OHIO LEG., https://www.legislature.ohio.gov/
legislation/legislation-status?id=GA131-HB-593 (last updated Nov. 10, 2016).
118 Compare H.B. 10, 132d Gen. Assemb., Reg. Sess. (Ohio 2017–2018), with H.B. 312,
133d Gen. Assemb., Reg. Sess. (Ohio 2019–2020).
119 House Bill 312 – Status, THE OHIO LEG., https://www.legislature.ohio.gov/
legislation/legislation-status?id=GA133-HB-312 (last updated Dec. 17, 2020).
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failure.120 House Bill 10’s first big step was lowering the registration fee to use
intrastate crowdfunding from $300 to $50.121 This fee was more reasonable and many
SMEs likely could have afforded it without crowdfunding. While $300 may not seem
like a lot to an entity raising $30,000, these registration fees are paid before the
crowdfunding campaign is launched and could pile up with other fees like attorney
fees; therefore, a lower registration fee around $50 could create both a more efficient
and inclusive bill. However, with regard to inclusivity specifically, HB 10 imposed
stronger regulations on portal operators and created an exception that provides for
certain government entities to run crowdfunding portals as they saw fit, which was a
stipulation that did not exist in HB 593.122 These stronger regulations and government
portal operators might force the portals to be extremely selective in what entities they
choose to be posted on their website for fear that they might be held responsible for a
faulty campaign. Therefore, the strong regulations, while likely an effective use
against fraud, would have highly limited the inclusivity of the bill and the efficiency
of an SME seeking to get onto a portal.
Next, HB 10 set the groundwork for affirmative acknowledgement in Ohio, which
required investors to affirmatively acknowledge that they were investing in an
unregistered risky entity, that it was an intrastate offering, that the purchaser was an
Ohio resident, and that the offering could not be sold for a period of nine months after
purchase. Lastly, HB 10 created an enforcement power—to fine both entities and
portals—to the Division of Securities.123 In the end, HB 10 appears to be modeled on
acts that exist in Michigan and North Carolina, which both limit investors to $10,000
per transaction, require quarterly disclosures, and have an entity offering limit of
$2,000,000.124 In the end, poor time management by the Ohio Legislature resulted in
a failed attempt to get equity-based crowdfunding passed.
Ohio finally adopted an intrastate crowdfunding program in HB 312, introduced
in 2019.125 The bill passed in 2020 is a revival of the original HB 312 from 2019.126
The original HB 312 (2019) had an interesting path, being passed in both the House
and the Senate, but for unexplained reasons, being sent back to a Senate committee
where it allegedly died until it was revived twelve months later and passed rather

120 Id.
121 Ohio H.B. 10; see Andrew A. Schwartz, Crowdfunding Securities, 88 NOTRE DAME L.
REV. 1457, 1470 (2013) (showing that crowdfunding securities should have lower registration
fees than more traditional financing methods).
122 Ohio H.B. 10; see also Jennifer A. Parker, Ohio Legis. Serv. Comm’n, Bill Analysis, Sub.
H.B. 10, 132d Gen. Assemb., at 2 (2018).
123 Ohio H.B. 10.
124 Interstate Crowdfunding Resources, supra note 13; Anthony J. Ceoli & Georgia P. Quinn,
Summary of Enacted Intrastate Crowdfunding Exemption, CROWDCHECK, https://perma.cc/
5UNS-QRM7 (last updated Dec. 2016).
125 H.B. 312, 133d Gen. Assemb., Reg. Sess. (Ohio 2019–2020).
126 House Bill 312 – Status, supra note 119.
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quickly.127 The original HB 312 (2019) was likely just another victim of pure
politicking. Its death in the legislature is speculated to have come from additional
amendments being added after passage in both houses, but with limited time left in the
legislative session before a concurrence vote could be held.128 What those
amendments consisted of is unclear.
Further, both the original and enacted HB 312, along with many sections of HB
10, are almost identical. Why was the enacted HB 312 (2020) passed but the other two
were not? While the answer is not clear, four possibilities arise based on a comparison
of the bills. First, the enacted HB 312 (2020) raised the offering limit for which entities
could ask to $5 million, the highest limit in the United States. 129 Second, the original
HB 312 (2019) makes the eligibility requirements for entities/issuers easier to
understand and easier to meet. Instead of having to meet a laundry list of requirements,
now entities must meet only one condition from three required sections. 130 Third, the
enacted HB 312 (2020) not only gave enforcement rights to the Division of Securities,
but opened up the opportunity for investors to sue entities and portals, and for entities
to sue portals, providing for more accountability and possibly resulting in more
efficiency within the program.131 House Bill 312 (2020) clearly provides the most
protection against fraud, as well as providing consumer protection. Lastly, the enacted
HB 312 (2020) had amendments placed at the end that provided funding for real estate
development to move forward to the Ohio Controlling Board in the amounts of $35
million, $25 million, and $10 million to Sherwin Williams, the Haslam Sports Group,
and Origin Malt, respectively.132 If true, the enacted HB 312 (2020) was never passed
with the intention of assisting SMEs and instead was a façade to getting already
existing companies money they needed to grow. As evidence of this, Sherwin
Williams and the Haslam Sports Group spoke in front of the Senate Committee on
Finance as proponents for the passage of HB 312.133
An implication that arises is that HB 312’s permittance of intrastate crowdfunding
was passed by both Chambers as a byproduct of getting these three Ohio companies
funding they needed to develop real estate in Ohio not through crowdfunding, but
rather through increases in state appropriations. In the end, the enacted HB 312 (2020)

127 Id.
128 JD Alois, Update: Ohio Passes an Intrastate Crowdfunding Law that Dies in the Senate
Before a Final Vote Can be Held, CROWDFUNDINSIDER (Jan. 7, 2019),
https://www.crowdfundinsider.com/2019/01/143020-ohio-passes-intrastate-crowdfundinglaw/.
129 Compare H.B. 10, 132d Gen. Assemb., Reg. Sess. (Ohio 2017–2018), with Ohio H.B.
312.
130 Carla Napolitano, Ohio Legis. Serv. Comm’n, Bill Analysis, H.B. 312, 133d Gen.
Assemb., at 3–4 (2020).
131 Id. at 13–15.
132 Vanac, supra note 37.
133 See Permits Certain Intrastate Equity Crowdfunding: Hearing on H.B. 312 Before the S.
Comm. on Fin., supra note 30 (statement of Josh Glessing, Haslam Sports Group) (statement of
Thomas Niehaus, The Sherwin Williams Company).
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appears to be the best of all three bills; however, based on the amendments in HB 312
and other substantive loopholes, there are areas of OhioInvests that could be improved
upon to give Ohio the most effective intrastate crowdfunding bill in the country.
III. DISCUSSION
As technological innovation increases and Ohio becomes more eager to attract new
talent and companies, the Legislature should create a new efficient, inclusive, and
effective law that allows SMEs to raise capital.134 That was one of the stated goals in
the passage of HB 312, but under current law, both regarding the JOBS Act and the
specific law in Ohio, businesses face too many obstacles to utilize equity-based
crowdfunding in a way that is advantageous.135 If more businesses utilize intrastate
crowdfunding, it presents immense benefits to both the state of Ohio and the
entrepreneurs that seek to use it. While different sources of fundraising all have their
own benefits, intrastate crowdfunding laws create a guard to the State’s economy and
create the most balance for SMEs in the areas of attempting to raise funds and running
their new entity.136 With federal legislation falling short and a state law that is too
similar to its federal counterpart in opening up new crowdfunding opportunities, Ohio
legislation must be re-addressed.
Clearly, Ohio realizes the importance of this topic given the passage of HB 312.137
As will be seen below, HB 312 has too many substantive shortcomings that make it
ineffective at achieving its dual goal of providing SMEs with more opportunity to raise
capital, while also making Ohio the most business-friendly state in the country.138 The
Ohio Legislature passed HB 312 with these dual goals in mind; however, the way HB
312 stands as enacted, a law to “Permit Certain Intrastate Crowdfunding” will neither
create more opportunities for SMEs nor help Ohio stand out as a business-friendly
state. While the Ohio Legislature has all the time in the world to pass this boilerplate
legislation that will have extraordinarily little impact on business within the state, 139

134 See Andrew J. Tobias, New Ohio Ad Campaign Aimed at Attracting Businesses Touts
State’s Low Taxes, Sparks Online Debate, CLEVELAND.COM (Feb. 11, 2021),
https://www.cleveland.com/open/2021/02/new-ohio-ad-campaign-aimed-at-attractingbusinesses-touts-states-low-taxes-sparks-online-debate.html (discussing one of Ohio’s attempts
in 2021 to get businesses to operate in Ohio).
135 If H.B. 312 does not present SMEs with an attractive option, they will just use other
financing options like bank loans and Regulation A+, which presents fewer benefits to both the
entrepreneurs and the state. See infra Part III.A.1, III.A.2.
136 Infra Part III.A.2.
137
Status
Reports,
THE
OHIO
LEG.,
https://www.legislature.ohio.gov/Assets/CurrentStatusReports/133/FormattedStatusReport.pdf
(last updated Nov. 2020); see The Ohio Legislature, House Bill 312 – Status, supra note 119.
138 Permits Certain Intrastate Equity Crowdfunding: Hearing on H.B. 312 Before the S.
Comm. on Fin., supra note 30 (statement of Rep. Jena Powell, Sponsor, H.B. 10).
139 Infra Part II.D; see Stephanie Black & Lynda de la Vina, Intrastate Crowdfunding: A
Best Practices Implementation Model for Evidence Based Measurement of State Impacts by
Oversight Agencies, 3 ACAD. OF BUS. RSCH. J. 55, 58–60 (2018) (discussing how most state laws
are identical to the JOBS Act).
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the SMEs of Ohio have little time to waste. Therefore, to achieve these goals and
provide more positive impacts to Ohio, a new bill that accounts for federal regulations,
fraud, and investor protections, while also adding more efficient procedures to assist
SMEs in raising the capital they need, must be re-introduced and passed. This
discussion will occur over numerous parts.
First, in Part A, this Note will look to answer the question, “does Ohio really even
need its own intrastate crowdfunding bill?” This analysis will consider why equitybased crowdfunding is better than other alternatives. Then, this Note will examine how
equity-based crowdfunding assists states in having a positive increase in the job
market, the economy, and the increase of innovation. Second, under Part B of this
Note, it will be important to return to the JOBS Act and discuss its failures, which
required the states to act on their own accord. Lastly, under Part C, the
counterarguments will be discussed, specifically regarding fraud, investor protections,
and the high rate at which small businesses fail. In the end, this analysis will show that
the benefits of legislation to the entrepreneurs and the state outweigh the costs and any
counterarguments. Then, in Part IV, an analysis of HB 312 and its weaknesses will be
examined to show that as the law stands now, it will neither assist SMEs nor have a
positive impact on the state. Lastly, in Part V, a blueprint—using Ohio’s three previous
attempts, the newly-minted HB 312, and procedures that work in other countries and
states—will show how Ohio can create far better results for the SMEs and citizens of
Ohio and possibly lead Ohio to actually become “the most business-friendly state in
the country.” 140
A.

Does Ohio Really Need to Pass Its Own Crowdfunding Legislation?

When crowdfunding is mentioned to people in the start-up industry, the question,
“does Ohio really need its own crowdfunding legislation?” is always asked. Many
people have gone as far to say that an intrastate crowdfunding law will never be
successful enough to be effective in Ohio.141 And the passage of HB 312 will likely
confirm their suspicions. Therefore, before this analysis can move forward, the
question must be asked: Does Ohio even need its own crowdfunding legislation? The
resounding answer is yes, for three reasons. First, intrastate crowdfunding presents
additional benefits for Ohio SMEs as compared to other funding alternatives. Second,
intrastate crowdfunding can have a positive impact on jobs, the economy, and
innovation within the state.142 Finally, as will be seen through Part A.1 and Part A.2,
the benefits of an intrastate crowdfunding law outweigh the costs.143 The
aforementioned critics are not without merit, however, and their arguments against
Ohio passing its own crowdfunding bill will be analyzed. In the end, a new intrastate
equity-based crowdfunding bill in Ohio is what is best for the state and its citizens.

140 Permits Certain Intrastate Equity Crowdfunding: Hearing on H.B. 312 Before the S.
Comm. on Fin., supra note 30 (statement of Rep. Jena Powell, Sponsor, H.B. 10).
141 Telephone Interview with Entrepreneurs from Bounce Innovation Hub (Sept. 12, 2020).
142 See generally Glustrom, supra note 51 (explaining that intrastate crowdfunding is known
for having a positive impact on jobs, the economy, and innovation in the state).
143 Infra Part III.A.1, III.A.2.
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Intrastate Equity-Based Crowdfunding Presents a Better Alternative for
SMEs of Ohio

Ohio SMEs, and particularly start-ups, face a large unmet need for capital,
sometimes called the “capital gap.”144 In fact, most SMEs fail because they lack
access to adequate capital.145 Overall, SMEs have many options when it comes to
seeking out finance. The most popular options include asking family and friends for
money, bank loans, venture capitalist firms, and Regulation A+ funding through the
SEC.146 In general, businesses who have utilized crowdfunding are seen to have saved
at least $5,000 in attorney fees and anywhere from $10,000 to $50,000 in compliance
costs.147 These savings could be greater when compared to the more traditional
sources of funding, but overall, due to intrastate crowdfunding’s focus on efficiency,
the ability of SMEs to use intrastate equity-based crowdfunding will likely save them
money in the long run.148 One reason for this could be because fewer or easier
disclosure requirements mean fewer attorney hours being billed on such forms. An
intrastate crowdfunding law could then assist in closing the capital gap by allowing
SMEs to save money in traditionally costly areas, while also providing them with new
methods of raising capital. This, in turn, makes it easier to obtain funding, creating
more efficiency than traditional methods.
Additionally, SMEs that use intrastate crowdfunding receive greater marketing
opportunities than through the use of family and friend loans, bank loans, venture
capitalists, or Regulation A+ funding.149 Unlike the JOBS Act, issuers of intrastate
offerings may advertise their offerings on state restricted websites and connect with
investors across the entire state.150 This can help businesses obtain cheaper advertising
alternatives, expand their customer base, and increase the number of investors they
could reach.151 Therefore, yet another opportunity that intrastate crowdfunding
presents which allows an SME to cut costs, while raising capital. This cost cutting
could open up funding to more people, showing how crowdfunding can be more
inclusive than traditional methods. But how does intrastate crowdfunding compare to
these alternatives specifically?
A majority of SMEs, including start-ups, receive a majority of their initial
financing by just asking their friends and family for loans and using their personal

144 See Jill E. Fisch, Can Internet Offerings Bridge the Small Business Capital Barrier?, 2 J.
SMALL & EMERGING BUS. L. 57, 59–60 (1998).
145 Id.
146 Id. at 59–64; see Borek, supra note 16, at 167–69.
147 Vignone, supra note 78, at 813–14.
148 Id.
149 Id. at 814.
150 See JOBS Act, Pub. L. No. 112-106, 126 Stat. 306 (2012); Infra Part V.
151 Vignone, supra note 78, at 814.
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resources (savings, credit cards, etc.).152 Some SMEs are able to raise anywhere from
$100,000 to $500,000 through these methods.153 However, for entrepreneurs who are
not in the upper middle class, these options might not be available to them, making
this a less inclusive option.154 Further, for the entrepreneurs that have access to this
funding, once they exhaust the funds, more financing is extremely difficult to find.155
This is where intrastate crowdfunding can present a better alternative. Instead of just
being able to ask family and friends for financing, intrastate crowdfunding opens the
door for issuers to be able to ask a whole statewide population for financing. Then,
when it comes to exhausting the financing options, intrastate crowdfunding is credited
with having more consistent cash flow investment for SMEs than through these
personal methods.156 Meaning, an entity who uses crowdfunding has it easier when
finding more funding than an entity who uses family and friends. An intrastate law is
seen as giving the SMEs more flexibility in how they operate through their initial
investment. More flexibility could lead to more efficiency as it becomes easier and
faster to obtain funding. When it comes to intrastate crowdfunding versus personal
financing options, intrastate crowdfunding gives more accessibility to more investors
while limiting the risk of exhausting all funding and not being able to find any more.
The next most popular option for entrepreneurs looking for financing is to get a
traditional bank loan.157 However, when it comes to obtaining bank loans, most SMEs
do not have the cash flow, the collateral, or the operating history to qualify.158 In short,
the SMEs who would use intrastate crowdfunding are very unlikely to get a bank loan.
Additionally, the amount of a loan that a bank gives out fluctuates with the
economy.159 Depending on the year, there might be very few bank loans available to
SMEs. Intrastate crowdfunding does not present these same hurdles. Using intrastate
crowdfunding, much like personal financing, allows the SMEs to have a long-term
capital source that is compatible with the fluctuation of the environment.160 This is
not to say that intrastate crowdfunding will not be impacted by changes in the market,
but it is less impacted than obtaining a bank loan. As Big Drop Brewing Co. has
shown, intrastate crowdfunding can be resistant to recessions and the ebbs and flows
of the economy, providing financial benefits to both the SMEs and the state. 161
Alternatively, by using intrastate crowdfunding, entrepreneurs can avoid the high rates

152 Bradford, supra note 16, at 101.
153 Id.
154 Id.
155 Id. at 102.
156 E.g., Fisch, supra note 144, at 61.
157 Bradford, supra note 16, at 102.
158 Id.
159 Fisch, supra note 144, at 60.
160 See id. at 59–64.
161 See About Big Drop, supra note 1; Hancock, supra note 1.
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of interest that come from using bank loans and feel less burdened when it comes to
paying those loans back.162 Not having the stress of paying back a bank loan could
open up the market to more people who fear the risk of default when starting their
business. This would increase both inclusivity and efficiency in the capital-raising
market. Therefore, while bank loans present certain benefits to some entities and are
an important alternative, intrastate crowdfunding can present a better option for SMEs
of Ohio seeking to start, expand, or improve their business.
Another possible source of fundraising is by seeking out a venture capitalist firm
and using private equity financing.163 However, SMEs that seek to use intrastate
crowdfunding are either seeking to do so as initial financing or to assist the business
in making repairs and improvements. Less than a quarter of venture capitalist funding
is for early-stage financing.164 Rapid growth is needed for a private equity firm to
even be attracted to investing in a company, and most SMEs are lacking in that area.165
Further, venture capitalist firms reject 99% of the business plans that are submitted to
them.166 So what are the plans outside that 1% acceptance rate supposed to do?
Intrastate crowdfunding lowers the search costs that many businesses incur in order to
find investors. This is because the cost to post to a portal is limited and there are not
generally any strict advertising requirements.167 Further, many angel investors and
private equity firms only invest in companies that come from a geographic region they
are familiar with.168 With intrastate crowdfunding, investment opportunities are open
to the entire state and can help communities who are traditionally ignored by private
equity firms, specifically minority-owned businesses and businesses in rural areas,
find the funding they need to succeed.169
The last financing option to compare to intrastate crowdfunding is Regulation
A+.170 This SEC regulation was altered with the passage of the JOBS Act.171 It
provides for issuers to raise anywhere from $6 million to $50 million depending on

162 Vignone, supra note 78, at 813–14.
163 Bradford, supra note 16, at 102.
164 U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFF., GAO, GAO/GGD-00190, SMALL BUSINESS: EFFORTS
TO FACILITATE EQUITY CAPITAL FORMATION 21 (2000).
165 Fisch, supra note 144, at 62.
166 U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFF., GAO, GAO/GGD-00190, SMALL BUSINESS: EFFORTS
TO FACILITATE EQUITY CAPITAL FORMATION 20 (2000).
167 Fisch, supra note 144, at 66.
168 Id. at 61–64.
169 See Glustrom, supra note 51, at 294.
170 17 C.F.R. § 230.251 (2015); see Borek, supra note 16, at 186.
171 See ANZHELA KNYAZEVA, REGULATION A+: WHAT DO WE KNOW SO FAR, SEC WHITE
PAPERS 1 (2016), https://www.sec.gov/files/Knyazeva_RegulationA%20.pdf; Borek, supra
note 16, at 186.
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the tier the entity is considered.172 This offering limit is exponentially higher than
what can be allowed through intrastate crowdfunding. However, Regulation A+ is one
of the most rule-heavy regulations regarding the JOBS Act and crowdfunding
financing.173 Further, it is seen more as an alternative to a small, registered IPO.174
Therefore, for entities that are seeking to use crowdfunding to invest in improvements
to their business or launch their company from the ground up, Regulation A+ is not a
viable option. This is because the transaction costs for intrastate crowdfunding are
significantly lower than through Regulation A+.175 In addition, Regulation A+ has
lengthy disclosure requirements that could end up making “a company hoping to raise
$100,000 . . . pay more for capital than it would by borrowing money with a credit
card.”176 In the end, intrastate crowdfunding has fewer disclosure requirements which
could lessen the burden on numerous SMEs seeking funding and increase
efficiency.177 Lastly, intrastate crowdfunding can assist SMEs in reaching investors
they would have not normally been able to reach.178 This is a clear advantage to
Regulation A+, as only 7.4% of Americans are eligible to be investors under the
regulation.179 By providing fewer disclosure requirements, costing less, and opening
the door to more investors, intrastate crowdfunding has clear advantages.
Intrastate crowdfunding is not for every SME seeking financing. The states know
that. For SMEs seeking to raise initial funding or seeking to use intrastate
crowdfunding to expand or improve their business, like Big Drop Brewing Co, it
provides the strongest option.180 Its main purpose is to assist as many SMEs as
possible in raising funds relatively efficiently and avoid all the red tape that exists
through federal financing. After comparing intrastate crowdfunding with personal
financing, bank loans, private equity financing, and Regulation A+, intrastate
crowdfunding can present a better alternative for the SMEs of Ohio.

172 JOBS Act, Pub. L. No. 112-106, § 401, 126 Stat. 306, 323-26 (2012); 17 C.F.R. §
230.251(a)(1) (2021).
173 See Borek, supra note 16, at 155–63.
174 KNYAZEVA, supra note 171, at 2.
175 Borek, supra note 16, at 186.
176 Robb Mandelbaum, What the Proposed Crowdfunding Rules Could Cost Business, N.Y.
TIMES BLOG (Nov. 14, 2013, 7:00 PM), http://boss.blogs.nytimes.com/2013/11/14/what-theproposed-crowdfunding-rules-could-cost-businesses/?_r=0; see KNYAZEVA, supra note 171, at
30 (stating that the disclosure requirements for Regulation A+ are extensive).
177 Borek, supra note 16, at 186.
178 Infra Part III.A.1.
179 Borek, supra note 16, at 170.
180 See About Big Drop, supra note 1; Hancock, supra note 1.
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Intrastate Crowdfunding and Its Impact on Jobs, the Economy, and
Innovation

Now that the benefits of intrastate crowdfunding to entrepreneurs have been
shown, it is important to understand the benefits that this crowdfunding alternative
presents to Ohio. Intrastate crowdfunding can impact many areas within a state, but
has the ability to have the greatest impact in the areas of jobs, the economy, and
innovation.181 In fact, the JOBS Act was passed with the intent to increase innovation
nationally, but when that failed, states were hoping to pick up on the stated benefits.182
States saw intrastate equity-based crowdfunding as an opportunity to attract more
talent to their state, increase the number of jobs, have a positive impact on the state’s
economy, and increase the amount of innovation that comes out of their states. 183
After examining each of these impacts, this Note will show that there is a clear benefit
to Ohio.
When it comes to intrastate crowdfunding, many states see it as an opportunity to
attract new talent and companies to their state, while also creating new jobs.184 In fact,
during the early times of intrastate crowdfunding, Georgia used its new law to market
and poach companies and talent from Ohio.185 Whether Georgia was successful or
not, companies launch their businesses in states in which they feel they can be
successful. One indicator for some SMEs is how business friendly their intrastate
crowdfunding laws are.186 Therefore, there is a benefit to having a strong intrastate
crowdfunding law, especially as they become more and more popular throughout the
United States. States want to encourage SMEs to launch within their boundaries
because throughout the country, SMEs comprise “99.7% of U.S. employer firms,
97.6% of firms exporting goods, and created 61.8% of net new private-sector jobs
between 1993-2016.”187 Because SMEs are the main job creators in each state, giving
them more opportunities to succeed, like through intrastate crowdfunding, provides a
significant benefit to the state in increasing the number of jobs available.
Additionally, crowdfunding itself is seen as being a job creator.188 Specifically,
anywhere from 270,000 to 2 million jobs have been added through the launch of

181 See Won, supra note 12, at 1405–12.
182 Id. at 1395–96.
183 La Croix, Guest Post: Some States Have Sidestepped the JOBS Act’s Burdensome
Crowdfunding
Rules,
THE
D&O
DIARY
(May
15,
2014),
https://www.dandodiary.com/2014/05/articles/securities-litigation/some-states-havesidestepped-the-jobs-acts-burdensome-crowdfunding-rules/.
184 Id.; Won, supra note 12, at 1404.
185 La Croix, supra note 183.
186 What Is Intrastate Equity Crowdfunding?, NAVIGANT L. GRP. (Sept. 3, 2015),
https://www.navigantlaw.com/what-is-intrastate-equity-crowdfunding/.
187 Won, supra note 12, at 1410.
188 Id. at 1404–05.
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equity-based crowdfunding.189 In fact, many commentators believe that the United
States should shift its focus from the 20th century emphasis on large corporations as
job creators to a 21st century emphasis on SMEs, because SMEs are more likely to
create jobs and keep them than large corporations.190 Therefore, by having an
effective intrastate crowdfunding law, states are able to create more jobs and keep
them for a longer period of time. Most businesses are unable to succeed on selffinancing or “bootstrapping it.” If the businesses are unable to succeed, they are not
creating jobs. Therefore, the impact on the job market from self-financed entities is
substantially less than the possible 270,000 jobs that intrastate crowdfunding has
created. Ohio has long had a focus on job creation, including creating its own nonprofit that is tasked with that goal.191 By having a clear example of the positive impact
that crowdfunding could have on the job market, Ohio should have passed an efficient
and effective bill, but the current HB 312 will not have such a positive impact on
Ohio.192
In addition to creating more jobs, intrastate crowdfunding laws have the ability to
create a positive impact on the economy.193 Big Drop Brewing Co. is one example
that highlights how, even while the market is crashing, viable SMEs are able to meet
their fundraising goals by utilizing intrastate crowdfunding.194 Regulating SME
financing at a local level through intrastate crowdfunding is likely to have a stronger
effect on the state market, because local conditions affect SMEs independent of the
national market.195 This is because the small size of crowdfunded offerings have a
more direct impact on the state, so they have a greater interest in regulating intrastate
crowdfunding.196

189
Economic
Value
of
Crowdfunding,
FUNDABLE,
https://www.fundable.com/learn/resources/infographics/economic-value-crowdfunding (last
visited Apr. 7, 2021).
190 See Won, supra note 12, at 1410.
191 Putting JobsOhio to Work for Ohioans, POL’Y MATTERS OHIO (May 6, 2020),
https://www.policymattersohio.org/research-policy/fair-economy/work-wages/puttingjobsohio-to-work-for-ohioans. The relative success or failure of this state created non-profit is
beyond the scope of this Note.
192 Infra Part IV.
193 See David M. Kirby, Small Businesses Can Make a Big Impact on the
Economy, HUFFINGTON POST (Dec. 6, 2017), https://www.huffingtonpost.com/david-mkirby/small-businesses-can-make_b_13127000.html.
194 See About Big Drop, supra note 1; Hancock, supra note 1.
195 Mathews, supra note 33, at 305.
196 The JOBS Act at a Year and a Half: Assessing Progress and Unmet Opportunities:
Hearing on S. 113-178 Before the S. Subcomm. on Sec., Ins. & Inv. of the S. Comm. on Banking,
Hous. & Urban Affairs, 113th Cong. 9–10 (2013) (statement of Rick Fleming, Deputy General
Counsel, North American Securities Administrators Association).
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Further, strong local business conditions have the ability to assist the state in
avoiding economic recessions.197 As of 2014, intrastate crowdfunding was thought to
have injected upwards of $65 billion into state economies. 198 As intrastate
crowdfunding grows, it is estimated that intrastate crowdfunding will contribute $500
billion in funding per year, which will generate approximately $3.2 trillion dispersed
throughout state economies.199 Therefore, the positive impacts that crowdfunding
could have on the economy are immense. If every resident of Ohio, for example,
invested $1 through intrastate crowdfunding, it could inject almost $12 million into
the state economy.200 These benefits to a state economy are better served through
intrastate crowdfunding, because viable SMEs who fund through crowdfunding have
higher success rates than businesses who receive funding from traditional methods.201
By encouraging SMEs to remain in the state, the state can create strong local
conditions that can help the state become more resistant to recessions and depressions,
something that does not exist through federal funding alternatives. 202 In the end, the
best way to describe the impact that intrastate crowdfunding could have on the state
market is by saying that it could provide a “huge impact,” because “statistics from the
Small Business Administration indicate . . . the general economy is
substantially affected by small business economics.”203 Therefore, Ohio needs its own
effective intrastate crowdfunding bill because it provides the most benefits to small
businesses, which in turn will provide a substantial impact to the state.
Lastly, intrastate crowdfunding has the ability to increase innovation within the
state.204 When intrastate crowdfunding laws are successful, meaning efficient and/or
inclusive, they have the ability to expand the entrepreneurial base in the state. 205
Intrastate crowdfunding is known for reducing capital risk and the reduction of that
risk increases innovation.206 Crowdfunding specifically has this impact on both the

197 See, e.g., Wendell Cox, How Texas Avoided the Great Recession, NEW GEOGRAPHY (July
19,
2010),
http://www.newgeography.com/content/001680-how-texas-avoided-greatrecession.
198 Economic Value of Crowdfunding, supra note 189.
199 Id.
200 Borek, supra note 16, at 170 (explaining the similar impact that would occur on the
economy if every person in the US invested $1).
201 Infra Part II.C.
202 See, e.g., Cox, supra note 197.
203 See Kirby, supra note 193; BUS. WIRE, INNOVATIVE DEVICE TECHNOLOGIES FIRST TO
SEEK FUNDING ON CLINTON-BACKED SBA ‘ACE-NET’ INTERNET SERVICE (1997) (reporting that
small businesses make up forty-seven percent of the U.S. Gross National Product).
204 See Won, supra note 12, at 1410.
205 Mathews, supra note 33, at 300.
206 See, e.g., NADINE SCHOLZ, THE RELEVANCE OF CROWDFUNDING: THE IMPACT ON THE
INNOVATION PROCESS OF SMALL ENTREPRENEURIAL FIRMS 61 (2015) (“Crowdfunding reduces
this risk . . . .”).
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investors and the businesses because it “is helpful in validating the market demand
and idea concept,” which is something that that traditional sources of financing lack
because it is hard for them to show the possibility of this demand. 207 Alternatively,
half of the top ten states for best start-up culture have intrastate crowdfunding laws.208
Three out of the other five states that do not currently have a law are in the process of
passing their own intrastate laws.209 Therefore, while intrastate crowdfunding laws
are not the only factor in creating a state with a strong start-up culture, they certainly
assist in building a strong and favorable culture. Thus, strong intrastate crowdfunding
laws are imperative in attracting talent and increasing innovation, which is one of the
main goals of HB 312.210 While there is not as much hard data on increasing
innovation like there is on jobs and the economy, states that have an intrastate
crowdfunding law generally have encouraged and increased innovation within their
states.
B.

The Failures of the JOBS Act and Forcing the Hands of the States

It is safe to say the JOBS Act did not meet its anticipated expectations. In fact,
issues with its passage began immediately. When Title III of the JOBS Act passed, it
delegated to the SEC the ability to create regulations that would oversee equity-based
crowdfunding in the United States.211 However, after the SEC received approximately
480 comment letters during notice and comment rulemaking, the Commission delayed
and did not release regulations until almost three years later. 212 This delay is claimed
to have put an undue burden on the states and is credited for having a severe impact
on the effectiveness of crowdfunding.213 While it is unclear what took the SEC so
long to issue these regulations, one possibility could be that while attempting to issue
regulations under the JOBS Act, the SEC was still working to issue a behemoth of
regulations under the Dodd-Frank Act of 2010.214 Because entities could not use FCF

207 Id.
208 La Croix, supra note 183.
209 Id.
210 Id.; see Permits Certain Intrastate Equity Crowdfunding: Hearing on H.B. 312 Before
the S. Comm. on Fin., supra note 30.
211 Title III of the JOBS Act is the specific provision of the Act that creates an equity-based
crowdfunding exception in the United States; however, most of the crowdfunding oversight
comes from SEC regulation. See JOBS Act, 126 Stat. 306, Title III (2012); Timothy M. Joyce,
1000 Days Late & $1 Million Short: The Rise and Rise of Intrastate Equity Crowdfunding, 18
MINN. J. L. SCI. & TECH. 343, 344–45.
212 Joyce, supra note 211, at 351; La Croix, supra note 183.
213 Joyce, supra note 211, at 352; see Matthew A. Pei, Intrastate Crowdfunding, 2014
COLUM. BUS. L. REV. 854, 857; see also Andrew A. Schwartz, Inclusive Crowdfunding, 2016
UTAH L. REV. 661, 669 (“The primary impetus for intrastate crowdfunding appears to be the
delay in finalizing regulations for retail crowdfunding under Title III of the JOBS Act.”).
214 Charles A. De Monaco et al., Order to Chaos: Dodd-Frank and the JOBS Act, FOX
ROTHSCHILD
LLP:
ATT’YS
AT
L.
(Oct.
2012),
https://www.foxrothschild.com/publications/order-to-chaos-dodd-frank-and-the-jobs-
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until the SEC published its regulations, entrepreneurs began pressuring their local and
state governments to pass equity-based intrastate crowdfunding legislation, as they
saw it as an opportunity to increase the success of SMEs and wanted to use its benefits
sooner rather than later.215 With that, the JOBS Act never fully recovered and failed
to provide for the businesses and individuals who were anxiously awaiting its passage.
Despite the delay in creating regulations, once the regulations were effective, a
new set of problems arose. These problems created issues in the areas of efficiency
and inclusivity.216 First, equity-based crowdfunding under the JOBS Act still has
extremely high transactional costs, limiting the efficiency legislators sought in passing
the legislation.217 The main purpose for passing the JOBS Act was to make it easier
for SMEs to raise capital than the regulations would require under Regulation D,
Regulation A+, or other funding alternatives.218 However, under the Act, more
requirements exist than for those other alternatives, with the exception of Regulation
D, upholding the traditional burden that existed in the first place.219 The SEC
predicted that campaign costs to utilize Title III of the JOBS Act could be in excess of
$100,000, and require an average of 100 hours of work to comply with the Act. 220
However, some commentators claim that the work hour requirement is severely
underestimated.221 Whether or not these numbers are underestimated is irrelevant, as
the cost in excess of $100,000 presents too high of a burden for most entities to use
equity-based crowdfunding under the JOBS Act. Further, most companies are seeking
to use intrastate crowdfunding to make improvements or repairs for their business, so
requiring over 100 hours of compliance work, if not more, does not make the JOBS
Act more efficient than any other financing alternative, defeating the whole purpose.
The upfront cost and compliance time requirement presents a huge barrier to SMEs
seeking to use Title III of the JOBS Act. In the United States, the average cost of
starting a small business is around $30,000.222 If an entrepreneur decided to raise this
money through equity-based crowdfunding, it would likely cost him/her $5,000 and

act/#:~:text=In%20April%20of%202012%20the,objectives%20in%20enacting%20Dodd%20
Frank.&text=To%20accomplish%20this%2C%20the%20JOBS,Emerging%20Growth%20Co
mpany%20(EGC).
215 La Croix, supra note 183.
216 Schwartz, supra note 6, at 907.
217 See 158 Cong. Rec. H1236 (daily ed. Mar. 7, 2012) (statement of Rep. Bachus).
218 Won, supra note 12, at 1400–01.
219 Chance Barnett, Why Title III of the JOBS Act Will Disappoint Entrepreneurs, FORBES
(May 13, 2016), https://www.forbes.com/sites/chancebarnett/2016/05/13/why-title-iii-of-thejobs-act-will-disappoint-entrepreneurs/?sh=43879f93c4be.
220 Id.
221 Id.
222 How to Estimate the Cost of Starting a Business from Scratch, MINORITY BUS. DEV.
AGENCY (Nov. 25, 2011), https://www.mbda.gov/news/blog/.
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75–100 hours of document preparation.223 If the entrepreneur decides to use a third
party, the cost would likely rise to around $7,100.224 Then, in order to comply with
the JOBS Act, each year, the business’ compliance costs would be around $3,000 a
year for three years, not including time spent on preparation. 225 Therefore, that total
is a little over $16,000 or half of what the SME raised, leaving little for the business
to use for operations.
Now, let us compare that to the offering limit set forth in the JOBS Act. There,
SMEs are capped at raising a maximum of $1 million annually through
crowdfunding.226 Comparatively, many SMEs require $2 million to $5 million to be
considered viable or profitable by venture capitalist or banks. 227 So, it is easy to see
that the offering limit is set too low for entrepreneurs and SMEs to utilize
crowdfunding as a viable financing option. While the offering limit is too low for
SMEs to use federal crowdfunding as a viable option, it is also too low to raise enough
funds to be considered viable by some banks and venture capitalists, which is another
option as to why some SMEs seek to use equity-based crowdfunding.228 The failure
of the Act was clear one year later. Under federal equity-based crowdfunding,
offerings equaled around $40 million, but offerings under the traditional SEC
registration exemption, Regulation D, equaled over $1.3 trillion. 229
The impact of these high transaction costs and low offering limits are clear and
common-sensical. They limit the inclusivity of crowdfunding and accomplish the
polar opposite of what the JOBS Act was created for. Therefore, Ohio must pass a law
that is more efficient to assist SMEs in the state to use equity-based crowdfunding,
even for minor offerings.230
C.

Counterarguments Against Ohio Passing a New Intrastate Crowdfunding
Law

The push for intrastate crowdfunding legislation is not without critics. In order to
see the benefits, it is important to understand the concerns. The biggest concerns come
from the area of SEC oversight, fraud, investor protections, and the high percentage
of small businesses that fail. The most obvious concern is that the SEC already

223 Won, supra note 12, at 1411 (citing Crowdfunding, 80 Fed. Reg. 71, 387, 497–71 (Nov.
16, 2015)).
224 Id.
225 Id.
226 Thomas Murphy, Playing to a New Crowd: How Congress Could Break the Startup
Status Quo by Raising the Cap on the Jobs Act’s Crowdfunding Exemption, 58 B.C. L. REV.
775, 795–96 (2017).
227 Won, supra note 12, at 1409.
228 Barnett, supra note 219.
229 Catherine Yushina, Regulation Crowdfunding: One Year in Force, CROWDFUND INSIDER
(May
16,
2017),
https://www.crowdfundinsider.com/2017/05/100442-regulationcrowdfunding-one-year-force/.
230 Schwartz, supra note 6, at 892.
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regulates crowdfunding, so the states do not need to act.231 While this is true, the
entities who need crowdfunding the most are generally small, community businesses,
so, because state economies are impacted first before the national economy, states
have a stronger interest to regulating crowdfunding towards the specific needs of
SMEs within their state.232 These stronger interests come from SMEs seeking an
overall less cumbersome way to raise capital, opening up the door to more
entrepreneurs. An entity seeking to use intrastate crowdfunding through Regulation D
and SEC oversight would have to comb through over 453 pages of regulations to
comply, whereas, with intrastate crowdfunding laws the goal is to get SMEs funding
through an easier, faster way. Thus, intrastate crowdfunding laws are needed, and each
state has gone through the trouble to pass their own law.233
Next, the most fervent reason cited as to why states should not regulate
crowdfunding independently is due to the perceived likelihood of fraud. In fact, studies
have found that when corporate fraud takes place, the state’s economy in which the
corporation’s headquarters is located sees a reduction in its stock market participation
as a whole, having a negative effect on both the state and national markets. 234 While
there is some evidence of fraud in crowdfunding through lawsuits like SEC v.
Ascenergy LLC, instances of fraud through intrastate crowdfunding are relatively
rare.235 In Ascenergy, the SEC brought an enforcement action after learning that
Ascenergy’s CEO spent $1.2 million in capital raised through crowdfunding as
payments to himself and transferred the other $3.8 million to a holding company that
had nothing to do with Ascenergy’s purpose.236 Therefore, this claim is not
completely unfounded, but instances like Ascenergy rarely happen.237
Many critics were nervous that an increase in equity and intrastate crowdfunding
would disproportionally increase the level of securities fraud.238 However, their
theories did not come true.239 There is actually more evidence of fraud through IPOs.
231 See Glustrom, supra note 51, at 303.
232 Infra Part III.A.2; see Glustrom, supra note 51, at 303 (discussing that Alaska businesses
need something different than a state in the southern continental United States); see, e.g., Cox,
supra note 197.
233 Jenni Bergal, States Try to Make It Easier to Raise Money with Crowdfunding,
GOVERNING (Aug. 21, 2014), https://www.governing.com/news/headlines/states-try-to-makeit-easier-to-raise-money-with.html.
234 Christa Hainz, Fraudulent Behavior by Entrepreneurs and Borrowers, in THE ECON. OF
CROWDFUNDING: STARTUPS, PORTALS, AND INV. BEHAV. 79–80 (Douglas Cumming & Lars
Hornuf eds., 2018).
235 See Glustrom, supra note 51, at 304; see also Complaint at ¶¶ 11, 46, SEC v. Ascenergy,
LLC, 2015 WL 6513864 (D. Nev., Oct. 28, 2015).
236 See Glustrom, supra note 51, at 304.
237 Id.
238 See Anita Anand, Is Crowdfunding Bad For Investors?, 55 CAN. BUS. L.J. 215, 222
(2014).
239 Won, supra note 12, at 1418.
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One study of over 3,000 IPOs found that 11.59% of the companies that went public
“committed fraud at the IPO stage.”240 However, evidence of fraud through
crowdfunding was found in only 14 out of 381 Kickstarter projects (3.7%).241 These
lower levels of fraud could be attributed to the crowd’s inquiry regarding the project
in an open dialogue, and the crowd’s ability to find projects with signals of quality.
Ethan Mollick, an Associate Professor of Management at The Wharton School of
Business, asserts that the underwriting protection that exists in IPOs is adequately
replaced by crowd due diligence in equity-based crowdfunding.242 Now, states’
legislation, including HB 312 in Ohio, have grown to include strong fraud protections
in their legislation, including the right to bring a private action against an issuer who
tries to perpetrate fraud.243 However, protecting investors and entities from fraud is a
large reason why states should proceed with caution when implementing their own
crowdfunding legislation.
The next major concern that is raised is the sophistication of the investors and the
high risk of loss.244 When intrastate legislation is passed, it permits almost anyone to
invest, and many investors will have no relevant experience. Therefore, they may be
unable to recognize that the risk of loss is extremely high.245 Requiring too much
disclosure places an undue burden on the issuer, but not enough disclosure can
undermine investor protections and intrastate crowdfunding as a whole.246
Unsophisticated investors are unlikely to know when an entity is committing fraud or
have the skillset to judge the merit or riskiness of investing in a particular business.247
In order to make less sophisticated investors more aware, states like North Carolina
and Michigan have investors affirmatively acknowledge that they are investing in an
unregistered risky enterprise. In North Carolina, this affirmative acknowledgment has
investors waive liability.248 This waiver of liability is not an actual protection to
unsophisticated investors but is used as a warning tool to highlight to more
unsophisticated investors that the risk is extremely high. However, things like
affirmative acknowledgement and liability waivers must be used in conjunction with
other investor protections, such as education and/or disclosures. But, without strong
investor protections built into intrastate laws, investors will not be willing to use

240 Tracy Yue Wang et al., Corporate Fraud and Business Conditions: Evidence from IPOs,
65 J. FIN. 2255, 2270 (2010).
241
Ethan
Mollick,
The
Promise
and
Perils
of
Crowdfunding, KNOWLEDGE@WHARTON (Nov.
7,
http://knowledge.wharton.upenn.edu/article/promise-perils-equity-crowdfunding/.

Equity
2013),

242 Id.
243 H.B. 312, 133rd Gen. Assemb., Reg. Sess. (Ohio 2019–2020).
244 Mathews, supra note 33, at 310–11.
245 Id.
246 Won, supra note 12, at 1416.
247 Mathews, supra note 33, at 310–11.
248 Id.
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intrastate crowdfunding. Luckily, there are some investor protections in the JOBS Act,
but when it comes to intrastate laws, HB 312 should provide more investor protections,
which could limit inclusivity but would ensure efficiency in protecting against fraud.
The last concern that is raised is the high rate at which small businesses fail and
why making it easier for them to gain capital is a good thing. Asking investors,
whether sophisticated in this area or not, to invest large sums of money in something
that has a high risk of failure is extremely challenging, especially when most SMEs
seeking to use intrastate crowdfunding do not have the high growth potential that
sophisticated investors are looking for.249 Approximately twenty percent of small
businesses fail within the first year, thirty percent of businesses will have failed by the
end of their second year, by the end of the fifth year about half will have failed, and
by the end of the decade only thirty percent of businesses will remain, which leaves
about a seventy percent failure rate overall.250 While more capital in the hands of more
SMEs is not always a good thing, equity-based crowdfunding and, more specifically,
strong equity-based crowdfunding laws, have built in protections to protect against
companies that are less desirable or likely to fail.251 In fact, an increase in the success
of a variety of implausible businesses shows that with more capital opportunities there
is a greater chance for many SMEs to succeed.252 Intrastate bills should strongly
consider fraud and investor protections and, through that, investors should have their
investment protected against loss when it comes to the high rate of business failure.253
Other countries have shown that while the risk of small business failure is always high,
SMEs funded via equity-based crowdfunding see a lower rate of insolvency. In
Germany, 70% of SMEs that had successful equity-based crowdfunding campaigns
were still in operation approximately five years after their successful campaign. 254 In
the United Kingdom, 85% of SMEs were still in operation. 255 Therefore, while there
is not as much data on how intrastate crowdfunding impacts SMEs in the United
States, examples from other countries show that the high rate of business failure is not
as important of a concern as some critics might make it seem.
These criticisms are all important. However, when looking at the concerns in Part
C of this Note and weighing them against the advantages to entrepreneurs and states
discussed in Part B, the benefits to the states and their innovators likely outweigh the
costs. Furthermore, each of these concerns can be addressed more easily through state
249 See Microcap Stock: A Guide for Investors, U.S. SEC. & EXCH. COMM’N (Sept. 18, 2013),
https://www.sec.gov/reportspubs/investor-publications/investorpubsmicrocapstockhtm.html
(discussing SMEs as one of the riskiest investment opportunities).
250 See Survival of Private Sector Establishments by Opening Year, BUREAU OF LAB. STAT.,
https://www.bls.gov/bdm/us_age_naics_48_table7.txt (last visited Apr. 9, 2021).
251 HAGEDORN AND PINKWART, supra note 41, at 71.
252 See Financing Innovation: The Future of Capital Formation for Small and Emerging
Businesses, CONF. PROC., LEWIS & CLARK L. F., (Sept. 26, 1997).
253 Id.
254 Lars Hornuf & Matthias Schmitt, Success and Failure in Equity Crowdfunding - CESifo
DICE Report, 14 LEIBNIZ INFO. CTR. FOR ECON. 2, 16–22 (2016).
255 Id.
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regulation in the intrastate market.256 Therefore, Ohio must have an intrastate
crowdfunding bill. But why will HB 312 not be as effective as legislators were hoping?
IV. HOUSE BILL 312, ITS FAULTS, AND PROVING THE CRITICS RIGHT
By an overwhelming majority of Ohio legislators, 117–2 to be exact, HB 312
appears to be the ideal Ohio intrastate crowdfunding bill for SMEs in Ohio.257
However, HB 312 fails to be either inclusive or efficient and is not likely to provide
the benefits discussed in Part III.A. Equity-based crowdfunding in the United States
has the dual goal of being both efficient and inclusive. 258 Ohio’s bill fails to
accomplish either of these goals.259 With most state intrastate crowdfunding bills
being carbon copies of the JOBS Act, it is easy to understand why the Ohio bill looks
like it does.260 In order to understand what the perfect intrastate crowdfunding bill
would look like in Ohio, it must first be examined how HB 312 is not one.
Intrastate crowdfunding bills seek to be a more efficient way for SMEs to raise
capital. However, Ohio’s HB 312, with the exception of the limit on the amount of
money to be raised, looks extremely similar to the JOBS Act, meaning that it is no
more efficient than its federal counterpart. While HB 312 prevents registration with
the SEC, it buries the entry requirements to be able to use intrastate crowdfunding
deep within the bill.261 Intrastate crowdfunding is intended to make raising capital
more efficient for the SMEs. If an SME struggling to gain capital cannot understand
what is needed to be able to use intrastate crowdfunding, they are less likely to use it
as an option, and, therefore, it clearly lacks the efficiency needed to make intrastate
crowdfunding faster than federal regulations.
Second, HB 312 gives the Ohio Division of Securities the power to hand out
licenses to entities seeking to operate portals that facilitate intrastate crowdfunding in
Ohio.262 However, by placing this licensing task within the Division of Securities, it
could possibly overload the Division, which will have a slew of new regulations to
promulgate and laws to comply with all while also attempting to vet and hand out
portal licenses. The SEC was overwhelmed with having to create regulations, pass out
licenses, and regulate the industry, which in turn undermined the effectiveness of the
JOBS Act. Anything that creates the possibility of a backlog, like portals waiting to
hear if they are licensed, inherently prohibits an efficient process. Lastly, the Ohio
Division of Securities was given the power to create reasonable rules to enforce HB

256 JAMES D. COX ET AL., SECURITIES REGULATION: CASES AND MATERIALS 304 (Rachel E.
Barkow et al. eds., 8th ed. 2017).
257 See H.B. 312, 133d Gen. Assemb., Reg. Sess. (Ohio 2019–2020) (Dec. 17, 2020)
https://www.legislature.ohio.gov/legislation/legislation-votes?id=GA133-HB-312.
258 Supra Part II; Schwartz, supra note 6, at 887.
259 Supra Part II.
260 Black & de la Vina, supra note 139, at 57–58.
261 H.B. 312 §1701.05(A), 133d Gen. Assemb., Reg. Sess. (Ohio 2019–2020).
262 Id. §17.07.17(A)(5).
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312.263 In the end, there are a number of sections that prohibit efficiency in intrastate
crowdfunding in Ohio. Ohio must attempt to prevent the same mistakes that occurred
at the federal level, but as HB 312 stands, the same mistakes are inevitable. But, maybe
HB 312 is more inclusive than efficient.
An inclusive intrastate crowdfunding bill would be one where any and all
entrepreneurs are invited to pitch their company to “the crowd” through an internet
portal. A highly inclusive bill would be a strong first step in getting Ohio to achieve
Representative Powell’s goal of making Ohio the most business-friendly state in the
country.264 However, inclusivity must be limited in some way to prevent fraud.265
The SEC recognized this and has regulations that apply at both the federal and state
level to prevent fraud in crowdfunding.266 With that being said, HB 312 is also not an
inclusive bill. A bill to Permit Certain Intrastate Crowdfunding places strict limits on
who and what can use intrastate crowdfunding in Ohio. While no one has advocated
for a fully inclusive system, the entry requirements in HB 312 significantly hinder
who can use crowdfunding at all. The enacted HB 312 fails to account for startups that
are not yet operating in the state. As the law stands, only currently existing entities
within the state can use OhioInvests.267 Further, HB 312 also places strict regulations
on how much a person can invest in an Ohioinvests offering. While the limit is set at
$10,000, that number is the same for all residents of Ohio.268 Therefore, the investing
limit creates an underinclusive environment by not permitting larger investments for
more sophisticated investors and possibly limits the effectiveness of the bill. Lastly,
HB 312 places hefty disclosure requirements on SMEs that will again limit who is
able to use it.269 If the purpose of the bill is to create a business-friendly environment
in Ohio, placing strict limits in the bill to keep people out is the antithesis of that
purpose. Therefore, HB 312 falls short in the area of inclusivity as well.
In the end, intrastate bills in the United States are intended to be both inclusive and
efficient. However, HB 312 fails to meet either of those goals because it neither speeds
up the process of gaining capital nor allows anyone, with a few exceptions, to use
crowdfunding to succeed. Therefore, this Note proposes that Ohio must recreate an
intrastate bill that works to be more inclusive and efficient. Through that, Ohio might
be able to reach its goal of becoming a state in which entrepreneurs seek to start their
businesses.

263 Id. §17.07.19(D).
264 Permits Certain Intrastate Equity Crowdfunding: Hearing on H.B. 312 Before the S.
Comm. on Fin., supra note 30 (statement of Rep. Jena Powell, Sponsor, H.B. 10).
265 Id.
266 Id. at 907–08.
267 H.B. 312, 133d Gen. Assemb., Reg. Sess. (Ohio 2019–2020).
268 Id.
269 Id.
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V. BLUEPRINT FOR INTRASTATE SUCCESS IN OHIO
While Ohio had some workable provisions in its first attempts and in the 2020 HB
312, there is still room for growth to make a bill that is more efficient and inclusive.
Instead of attempting to pass a crowdfunding bill before the session ended, the Ohio
Legislators should have looked to states like Michigan (MILE Act) and countries like
New Zealand to see what makes an efficient and inclusive intrastate crowdfunding
platform.270 However, even efficient bills like the MILE Act could be made stronger.
One benefit to being one of the last states to pass an intrastate bill is that the Legislators
have the ability to see what worked and what did not in other areas. This part of the
Note seeks to provide a blueprint for altering HB 312 to achieve the goal of both the
legislature and crowdfunding in general: to create a successful intrastate crowdfunding
legislation in Ohio that focuses on efficiency, while not wholly neglecting inclusivity.
To do this, a comparison to Ohio’s three previous attempts at an intrastate bill and
sections of the 2020 HB 312 will be used to craft four clear sections deserving of
analysis. These sections include restrictions on entities seeking to use intrastate
crowdfunding, limits on investors and the amounts raised, disclosure requirements,
and portal operations. While there are certainly more than four categories in HB 312,
these provisions have the greatest impact on investors and entrepreneurs and are given
the most flexibility for states to change from SEC regulations.271
First, for intrastate crowdfunding to be more efficient and inclusive in Ohio, it
would have to provide fewer restrictions than other exemptions that entities could use
to raise money.272 The 2020 HB 312 begins to provide this by removing the long
requirements from HB 593 and HB 10 and creating this either/or regulation, where
entities only have to meet one of the three options.273 However, the legislators were
nervous about making it easier for SMEs to meet crowdfunding conditions due to the
possibility of fraud.274 In part, it requires that the business either has its principal
office in Ohio, has at least 80% of its assets in Ohio, or the entity derived at least 80%
of its gross revenue in the state.275 However, HB 312 leaves out one key group of
entrepreneurs: people seeking to start their business in Ohio. So, these entrepreneurs
have the option to register their principal place of business in Ohio, but the other two
options are unavailable to them, limiting inclusivity, but mainly creating a barrier for
efficient capital-raising for new SMEs. Further, intrastate crowdfunding is used to help
innovators determine whether their idea is viable.276 Therefore, an Ohio bill must
account for this additional group in order to make the bill more efficient and inclusive.

270 Schwartz, supra note 6, at 885–86.
271 Securities Act of 1933 §3(a), 15 U.S.C. § 77(a).
272 Joyce, supra note 211, at 371.
273 See Carla Napolitano, Ohio Legis. Serv. Comm’n, Bill Analysis, H.B. 312, 133d Gen.
Assemb., at 3–4 (2020).; H. B. 312, 133d Gen. Assemb., Reg. Sess. (Ohio 2019–2020).
274 Permits Certain Intrastate Equity Crowdfunding: Hearing on H.B. 312 Before the S.
Comm. on Fin., supra note 30 (statement of Jason Warner, H.B. 10).
275 H. B. 312, 133d Gen. Assemb., Reg. Sess. (Ohio 2019–2020).
276 Won, supra note 12, at 1409.
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Ohio should add a condition to require the entity to have a business plan that
describes the entity’s plan to conduct at least 80% of its operations within the state.
This would create a new uniform “80% rule,” which makes it easier for entrepreneurs
to understand what is required to begin intrastate crowdfunding, increasing efficiency
in being able to launch their intrastate crowdfunding campaign. Further, the 80% entry
requirement will require the entity to get approval from the Division of Securities by
submitting either the business plan for verification or forms that provide evidence of
the SME’s assets or gross revenue before being allowed to engage in intrastate
crowdfunding. While requiring businesses to get approval from the Division of
Securities may hinder both efficiency and inclusivity, it may prevent those rare
instances of fraud in crowdfunding, which the legislature must consider before an
intrastate crowdfunding bill would gain any traction.277 The Division of Securities is
the enforcement agency in HB 312, giving them the ability to fine entities and portals,
and making them the obvious choice to continue the regulation of crowdfunding in
Ohio.278 Lastly, these requirements are significantly less burdensome than the
requirements under Regulation 147/147A, Regulation D, or those mentioned in HB
593, 10, or the 2019 and 2020 HB 312. 279 Compliance with Regulation 147/147A or
Regulation D requires constant disclosures to the SEC and the retainer of an attorney
in order to understand how to fully comply with the regulations, whereas, through this
new proposal, entities would be able to save on the costs by having fewer requirements
to meet when launching their capital campaign and may only need an attorney through
the initial offering.280 Therefore, this new proposal could make intrastate
crowdfunding more efficient, effective, and inclusive within the state.
Second, limits must be placed on both the amount allowed to be raised and the
kinds of people who can invest.281 Ohio should retain the $5 million offering limit
from HB 312, as it would give Ohio the highest offering limit in the country, and $5
million is the maximum limit within federal law and keeps Ohio compliant with the
JOBS Act.282 This would achieve the legislature’s goal of making Ohio “the most
business friendly state in the country.”283 Therefore, the offering limit requires very
little change from the way it stands currently.284 Moreover, this high limit allows
SMEs to use crowdfunding concurrently with other sources of capital raising, rather
than just using it initially to “fill the gap.”

277 Supra Part III.C.
278 H.B. 10, 132nd Gen. Assemb., Reg. Sess. (Ohio 2017–2018).
279 Supra Part III.
280 Vignone, supra note 78, at 813.
281 Murphy, supra note 226, at 779.
282 H.B. 312, 133d Gen. Assemb., Reg. Sess. (Ohio 2019–2020).
283 Permits Certain Intrastate Equity Crowdfunding: Hearing on H.B. 312 Before the S.
Comm. on Fin., supra note 30 (statement of Rep. Jena Powell, Sponsor, H.B. 10).
284 See generally H.B. 312, 133rd Gen. Assemb., Reg. Sess. (Ohio 2019–2020).
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However, where Ohio must alter HB 312 is by adding in an “all-or-nothing”
provision in its bill.285 This provision provides that the money invested by investors
will be held in escrow until the entity meets its fundraising goal. This provision is at
the cost of inclusivity, as entities who cannot meet their goals will have intrastate
crowdfunding made unavailable to them. But it is important for investor protections
and efficiency, because if a company cannot obtain sufficient attention through
crowdfunding, it might be an indicator of its success. 286 A failure to meet the goal
gives the investors a refund of their investment and creates zero loss. This is an
important provision in protecting investors against less successful entities, because it
requires the entity to really consider its financing needs before posting its goal and
will assist less sophisticated investors in seeing what can get more sophisticated
investors to invest.287 Unlike the North Carolina version, Ohio should not allow
investors to withdraw their investment whenever they want leading up to the entity
hitting its goal. The only option for withdrawal in Ohio should be if the entity fails to
meet its goal. This assists in the efficiency that entities seek through intrastate
crowdfunding in getting capital faster than through other methods.288 While it will not
entirely mitigate the high risk of loss, anything the State can do to protect those less
sophisticated investors from large losses can ensure that OhioInvests is a long-term
viable option within the state.
Setting investor eligibility requirements involves difficult trade-offs. Each of the
Ohio bills limited unaccredited investors to $10,000 in a single transaction. 289 While
this is the standard practice, it does not account for more sophisticated investors who
might have a higher net worth and some experience with investing in securities. It also
allows those less sophisticated investors to invest $10,000 in a single transaction with
no regard towards their income, creating catastrophic scenarios for investors who
invest that limit, but might not have the income to support it. This, in turn, could scare
others away from taking part in the intrastate crowdfunding process. Therefore, Ohio
must create a different rule for unaccredited investors and provide both set dollar limits
and a percentage limit based on income. For example, unaccredited investors making
$100,000 or less will be allowed to invest no more than 5% of their income in a twelvemonth period, and no more than $1,500 per transaction. This limits the risk and
possible loss of each investor in a single transaction but allows them to invest in more
entities based on their income, which is important to both allow new people to get into
the market, while also supporting the SMEs who need intrastate crowdfunding.
Additionally, unaccredited investors making more than $100,000 will be allowed to
invest no more than 15% of their income in a twelve-month period and are limited to

285 Uriel S. Carni, Protecting the Crowd Through Escrow: Three Ways That the SEC Can
Protect Crowdfunding Investors, 19 FORDHAM J. CORP. & FIN. L. 683 (2014); see Mathews,
supra note 33, at 315; see H.B. 593, 131st Gen. Assemb., Reg. Sess. (Ohio 2015–2016).
286 Tina Rosenberg, On the Web, A Revolution in Giving, N.Y. TIMES (Mar. 31, 2011),
http://opinionator.blogs.nytimes.com/2011/03/31/on-the-web-a-revolution-in-giving/ (quoting
Ethan Zuckerman, senior researcher at Harvard’s Berkman Center for Internet and Society).
287 Bradford, supra note 16, at 139–41.
288 See Mathews, supra note 33, at 315.
289 H.B. 312, 133rd Gen. Assemb., Reg. Sess. (Ohio 2019–2020).
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no more than $10,000 per transaction. While this would limit unaccredited investors,
accredited investors will still comply with the current SEC regulations, meaning that
individuals worth more than $1,000,000 and institutions that qualify as accredited
investors under 17 C.F.R. Parts 230 and 240 can invest without any quantity limits.290
This new provision would allow SMEs in Ohio to “test the waters” for others.291 States
are traditionally seen as experimental laboratories, so by Ohio becoming the first state
to set a limit like this, it can explore intrastate crowdfunding in a new way and help
fill the void of information regarding this newer form of investing. 292
Third, OhioInvests must change the disclosure requirements so as not to cause
compliance to be an extreme burden on the SMEs in the hopes of increasing efficiency.
House Bill 312 places a laundry lists of disclosure requirements that, in the end, are
extremely expensive for the entities. Heavy disclosure requirements cause entities to
avoid crowdfunding due to the high compliance costs. 293 House Bill 312 requires
disclosures before a person invests and multiple times a year, and requires specialized
forms that require the hiring of a third party.294 However, to increase efficiency,
disclosure pre-investment—meaning disclosures made to the Division of Security and
the Portal before the funding campaign is launched—should be applied to every entity
but be limited to only what would be required for the entity to receive a small business
loan.295 This includes: business and personal credit scores, tax returns, income
statements, business plans, and/or business organization documents. 296 Because
entities are generally seeking either a loan or to use intrastate crowdfunding, the
disclosure requirements prior to launching their campaign should not be more
burdensome than other alternatives.
For post-investment disclosures—meaning disclosures that will occur at set times
after the campaign has concluded—Ohio should change the requirements based on the
amount of the offering. These post-investment disclosures will require the same as the
pre-investment disclosures, but will then include all financial statements, profit and
loss statements, bank statements, and payroll records. States like North Carolina and
Alaska have similar disclosure requirements like this, and they have proven to be both

290 See generally 17 C.F.R §§ 230, 240 (2020).
291 Won, supra note 12, at 1412–13 (comparing how Exemptions A and B from the United
Kingdom will allow the states to test the waters before soliciting money from investors).
292 Mathews, supra note 33, at 305–06; see, e.g., Santosky v. Kramer, 455 U.S. 745, 773
(1982) (Rehnquist, J., dissenting) (“It is one of the happy incidents of the federal system that a
single courageous State may, if its citizens choose, serve as a laboratory; and try novel social
and economic experiments without risk to the rest of the country.”).
293 Black & de la Vina, supra note 139, at 64.
294 See H.B. 593, 131st Gen. Assemb., Reg. Sess. (Ohio 2015–2016); H.B. 10, 132nd Gen.
Assemb., Reg. Sess. (Ohio 2017–2018); H.B. 312, 133rd Gen. Assemb., Reg. Sess. (Ohio 2019–
2020).
295 Won, supra note 12, at 1412.
296 Id.
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efficient and effective in protecting against fraud.297 The law for post-investment
requirements should require entities asking for less than $500,000 to have no financial
disclosure requirements; entities asking for $500,000–$1 million to have annual
financial disclosure requirements; entities raising between $1 million–$3 million to
have semi-annual disclosure requirements; and entities seeking more than $3 million
in offerings to have quarterly disclosure requirements to shareholders and the Division
of Securities. This uniform application will allow an entity to know what the disclosure
requirements are from the start and what documents they must keep track of. But, more
importantly, by keeping the cost low, Ohio is hopefully allowing the entities to use a
little, and not most, of the money raised through crowdfunding to comply with these
post-disclosure costs. Disclosures are a necessary evil of offering securities, but Ohio
must recreate the law to ensure that it can accomplish the disclosure goals while not
making them a barrier to inclusive entry.
Next, portals must be regulated. In all thirty-six states, including Ohio’s HB 312,
agencies within the state are given the ability to license privately operated portals to
conduct intrastate crowdfunding in accordance with the law. Certain states’
governments are also authorized to operate their own portals, but in none of the other
states are the portals operated by only government entities.298 Inviting private entities
to create intrastate crowdfunding portals could be beneficial to the state and encourage
competition, but a different approach should be taken in Ohio. Ohio is fortunate
enough to have a non-profit, JobsOhio, whose mission is to create economic
development and capital investment in Ohio through business attraction, retention, and
expansion efforts.299 This Note proposes that, in Ohio, the portal should be regulated
by the Ohio Division of Securities but under the control of JobsOhio because having
one centralized portal for the entire state could increase efficiency and ensure
transparency.300 JobsOhio can then use the fees earned through intrastate campaigns
to assist the state in other economic development initiatives. Then, the agency’s six
economic development partners spread throughout the state in six different regions
would be responsible for the portal operations in their territory. The partners’ close
relationship with entrepreneurs in their region could make Ohio a leading state for
efficient and inclusive portal operations. By moving portal operations into one
centralized government/non-profit entity it would allow each regional office to cater
the portal to its regional needs, which is important in a state where each region presents

297 See, e.g., Mathews, supra note 33, at 306–07; see, e.g., Glustrom, supra note 51, at 317.
298 Intrastate Crowdfunding Legislation & Regulation, N. AM. SEC. ADM’RS ASS’N
(NASAA)
https://www.nasaa.org/industry-resources/securities-issuers/intrastatecrowdfunding-directory (2019); see H.B. 593, 131st Gen. Assemb., Reg. Sess. (Ohio 2015–
2016), see H.B. 10, 132nd Gen. Assemb., Reg. Sess. (Ohio 2017–2018); see H.B. 312, 133rd
Gen. Assemb., Reg. Sess. (Ohio 2019–2020); see JENNIFER A. PARKER, BILL ANALYSIS OF SUB.
H.B. 10 AS RE-REPORTED BY S. RULES AND REFERENCE, S. 132nd, Reg. Sess., at 2 (2018).
299 About Us, JOBSOHIO, https://www.jobsohio.com/about-jobsohio/about-us/ (last visited
Oct. 30, 2020).
300 See Hornuf & Schmitt, supra note 254, at 17 (stating how the less transparent a portal is,
the more likely the campaign is to either not reach its fundraising goal or become insolvent
within five years).
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unique challenges.301 While Ohio would be the first to do something like this, it would
both assist the country in “testing the waters” and increase efficiency in allowing
SMEs to raise capital in an arena that is highly complex and considered a hindrance
to innovation.302
The last step that the Ohio Legislature must take to achieve true efficiency, while
also working to become the most business-friendly state in the country, is to create a
research and data collection provision of the bill.303 In order for an intrastate
crowdfunding bill to be efficient and to ensure that it continues to be inclusive, it must
have a codified structured process for collecting and analyzing data. 304 Michigan’s
MILE Act has an implemented means of collecting data and uses that data to determine
the effectiveness of the law.305 Because of it, Michigan is considered the leader for
entities looking to use crowdfunding to grow.306 If there is no way to collect or analyze
data, then Ohio will be unable to determine what the state’s entrepreneurs need. If
Ohio is going to continue to advertise itself as the state to which businesses should
flock,307 then there must be an understanding of what is going to work and what will
not, especially for the most vulnerable of entities, SMEs. This Note recommends that
the collection and analysis of date be conducted by the Ohio Division of Securities. It
already oversees the program through HB 312, but the legislature should add this
additional responsibility and collect data in the areas of how much money is being
raised, what percentage of capital is coming from crowdfunding, what specific regions
are doing what, and investor information.308 Through this data, Ohio can publish a
measurement of the economic impact crowdfunding is having on the state. 309 The way
the law stands now, Ohio has no mechanism for determining the efficiency,
inclusivity, or effectiveness of OhioInvests. Therefore, in order to achieve the state’s
goal, the legislature must change HB 312.
In the end, where there is SEC oversight, intrastate crowdfunding will never be as
successful as it could be. And that stands true for Ohio’s HB 312. But, by attempting

301 While also getting rid of the high cost associated with licensing portals, having one
centralized portal could also remove another fee that the SMEs would have pay, which would
again increase the number of SMEs who could use intrastate crowdfunding in the state.
302 Supra Part IV.
303 Black & de la Vina, supra note 139, at 64.
304 Id. at 64–65.
305 Id. at 64.
306 Id.
307 See Andrew J. Tobias, New Ohio Ad Campaign Aimed at Attracting Businesses Touts
State’s
Low
Taxes…,
CLEVELAND.COM
(Feb.
11,
2021),
https://www.cleveland.com/open/2021/02/new-ohio-ad-campaign-aimed-at-attractingbusinesses-touts-states-low-taxes-sparks-online-debate.html (discussing Ohio’s attempts in
2021 to get businesses to operate in Ohio).
308 Black & de la Vina, supra note 139, at 64–67.
309 Id.
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to simplify the process and lessening regulations to make intrastate crowdfunding a
more attractive option for SMEs, Ohio can help attract and retain businesses by
becoming a state that is both more efficient and inclusive.
VI. CONCLUSION
Almost three-quarters of the United States, including Ohio, have taken
crowdfunding into their local hands. Unfortunately, most states have failed to make
intrastate crowdfunding effective. Intrastate crowdfunding is not a be-all, end-all
solution to bridging the capital raising gap that many SMEs face every year. But, with
careful (re)execution, and a (re)simplified process, Ohio could be on the forefront of
intrastate crowdfunding legislation and become a state that entrepreneurs and
innovators seek out to launch their businesses. Big Drop Brewing Co. proved that even
in the lowest of economic recessions, equity-based crowdfunding could be used to
help businesses achieve their goals. Therefore, Ohio has a lot to lose by not passing
the most effective law. By altering HB 312 to achieve the true goals of crowdfunding,
Ohio can increase innovation, which in turn will increase the job market, which would
have a positive effect on the state economy.310 Ohio was late to join the crowd, and
when it did it did not put its best foot forward. Therefore, a new crowdfunding bill
must be enacted, so that the next great class of entities can succeed in Ohio.

310 Yushina, supra note 229.
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